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ABSTRACT'Players’!use!of! cooperative! strategies! in!Prisoner’s!Dilemma! (PD)!games!and!their! achievement! of! coordination! in! some! kinds! of! coordination! games! are!among! the! most! studied! issues! in! both! theoretical! and! experimental! game!theory.!The!present!thesis!is!a!collection!of!three!article!on!this!topic.!!Chapter!2!of!the!thesis!focuses!on!cooperation,!by!developing!an!evolutionary!model!of!a!repeated!Prisoner’s!Dilemma!game,!using!replicator!dynamics.!The!evolution! of! cooperation! is! analysed! in! terms! of! the! interaction! of! different!strategies,!which!represent! the!heterogeneity!of! forms!of!cooperation! in!civil!life.! One! of! the! results! of! the! paper! is! the! conclusion! that! cooperation! is!favoured! by! heterogeneity:! the! presence! of! different! kinds! of! strategies!enhances!cooperation.!A! theory! that! can! explain! both! cooperation! and! coordination! is! team!reasoning.!Chapter!3!represents!a!development!of!Bacharach’s!theory!of!team!reasoning.! Starting! from! a! detailed! review! of! Bacharach’s! writings,! and! in!order! to! clarify! some! issues! linked! to! reasoning! and! frames,! I! propose! a!‘vacillation’!model!in!which!agents!are!allowed!to!have!both!I!and!weL!concepts!in!their!frames,!and!can!easily!switch!from!one!to!another.!The! theoretical!model! presented! in! Chapter! 3! is! followed! by! an! experiment,!reported! in! Chapter! 4.! The! experiment! aims! at! identifying!which! features! of!the! structure! of! payoffs! in! coordination! games! favour! the! use! of! team!reasoning,! using! LevelLk! theories! as! the! benchmark! for! the! modelling! of!individual! reasoning.! We! find! mixed! evidence! about! levelLk! and! team!reasoning!theories.!In!particular!team!reasoning!theory!fails!to!predict!choices!when!it!picks!out!a!solution!which!is!Pareto!dominated!and!not!compensated!by! greater! equality.! This! could! represent! a! step! forward! in! investigating! the!roles! of! team! reasoning! and! levelLk! reasoning! in! explaining! coordinating!behaviour.!!!
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PREFACE'!! The! three! articles! collected! in! this! thesis! include! some! collaborative!work.! Chapter! 2! is! a! joint! work! with! Luigino! Bruni.! The! mathematical!evolutionary!model! –! including! the! proofs! in! the! Appendix! C,! is! entirely!my!work!and!I!also!contributed!to!the!writing!up.!The!paper!has!been!published!in!



















1.!Cooperation!and!coordination!in!game!theory:!main!issues!!Players’!use!of! cooperative! strategies! in!Prisoner’s!Dilemma! (PD)!games!and!their! achievement! of! coordination! in! some! kinds! of! coordination! games! are!among! the! most! studied! issues! in! both! theoretical! and! experimental! game!theory.!In! classical! game! theory! there! are! problems! in! explaining! both! cooperation!and! coordination.! The! problem! of! coordination! in! games! arises! from! the!existence!of!multiple!equilibria.!In!oneHshot!coordination!games,!classical!game!theory!cannot!establish!which!equilibrium!will!be!selected.!!According!to!Colin!Camerer:!“Predicting!which!of!many!equilibria!will!be!selected!is!perhaps!the!most! difficult! problem! in! game! theory.! This! selection! problem! is! essentially!unsolved!by!analytical!theory”!(2003,!p.!336).!!Some! refinements! of! equilibrium,! such! as! payoff! dominance! and! risk!dominance! (Harsanyi! and! Selten! 1988),! have! been! proposed! as! means! of!solving! this! problem.! ! However,! such! refinements! need! a! broader! theory! to!explain!why! rational! agents! can! be! guided! by! the! principles! on!which! those!
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school!was!searching!for”:!a!payoff5dominated!Nash!equilibrium!“is!not!only!an!equilibrium;!it!is!a!perfectly!good!equilibrium”.!!Another!device!which!helps!to!choice!among!equilibria! in!coordination!problem!is! ‘focality’,! linked!to! the!so!called! ‘Schelling! salience’:! sometimes! equilibria! are! focal! or! psychologically!prominent!(Schelling,1960;!Metha!et!al.,!1994;!Bardsley!et!al.,!2010;!Crawford!et!al.,!2008;!Isoni!et!al.,!2012).!!But!game!theory!needs!to!explain!why!rational!players!are!influenced!by!focality.!!One5shot!PD!games!pose!a!different!problem.!!In!a!PD!game!there!is!a!unique!Nash!equilibrium!–!defection!by!both!players!–!which!is!Pareto!dominated!by!the!combination!of!payoffs!resulting!from!cooperation.!!Classical!game!theory!implies! that! rational! players! would! always! defect.! ! However,! experimental!evidence! shows! that! subjects! cooperate! much! more! than! standard! game!theory!predicts1.! Thousands!of! pages!have!been!written!on!how!cooperative!choices! in! a! PD! game! can! be! explained.! ! ! Some! theorists! have! explained!cooperation! in! terms! of! adherence! to! moral! rules! grounded! on! Kantian!morality! (Laffont,! 1975;! Collard,! 1978,! 1983),! reciprocity! (Sugden,! 1984),!instrumental! rationality! (Gauthier,! 1986),! or! expressive! rationality! (Benn,!1978;! Hargreaves! Heap,! 1997),! or! to! social! norms! (Elster,! 1989;! Bicchieri,!1997,! 2006).! ! Other! theorists! have! explained! cooperation! as! resulting! from!social!preferences!reflecting!altruism!(Sober!and!Wilson!1988,!Bergstrom!and!Stark,! 1993,Taylor! 1976,! 1987),! inequity! aversion! (Bolton! and! Ockenfels,!2000;! Fehr! and! Schmidt,! 1999),! reciprocity! and! strong! reciprocity! (Axelrod!1984;!Rabin!1993;!Levine,!1998;!Falk!and!Fischbacher,!2005;!Dufwenberg!and!Kirchsteiger,!2004;!Segal!and!Sobel,!1999;!Fehr!and!Fiscbacher,!2005).!A! theory! that! can! explain! both! cooperation! and! coordination! is! team!reasoning.!Chapters!3!and!4!of!this!thesis!are!concerned!with!team!reasoning.!I!shall! introduce! team! reasoning! theories! later! on! in! the! introduction,! by!presenting!a!brief!literature!review.!Another!branch!of! literature! that!deals!with!cooperation!and!coordination! in!game! theory! is! evolutionary! game! theory.! Chapter! 2! of! this! thesis! reports! a!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!See!Hargreaves!Heap!and!Varoufakis!(2004)!for!a!review.!
!! 11!
theoretical!model!which!makes! use! of! evolutionary! game! theory! in! order! to!explain!cooperation!in!a!PD!game.!I!will!introduce!it!in!the!next!section.!
!
2.!Evolution!of!cooperation!Evolutionary!game!theory,!in!its!best!known!form,!is!based!on!the!evolution!of!proportions! of! relevant! strategies! present! in! a! population,! according! to!replicator!dynamics,!which!embodies!the!idea!of!Darwinian!selection,!or!of!the!imitation!of!the!most!successful!strategies!over!time.!Although! evolutionary! ideas!have! a! long!history! in! economics! (Darwin!1859!referred!to!Malthus’s!theory,!Marshall![1890,!xiv]!claims!that!economic!biology!is! the! ‘Mecca’! of! economists),! the! use! of! them! in! game! theory! is! relatively!recent! (see! Boyd! and! Richerson,! 1985,! Sugden! 2004! [first! edition! 1986],!Weibull,!1995).!Evolutionary!game!theory!offers!explanations!of!coordination!(see!Balkenborg,!1993!and!Robles!2001)!and!cooperation!(see!Axelrod!1984,!Hoffman!1999,!Sugden!2004).!!Chapter!2!of!the!thesis!focuses!on!cooperation,!by!developing!an!evolutionary!model!of!a!repeated!Prisoner’s!Dilemma!game,!using!replicator!dynamics.!The!evolution! of! cooperation! is! analysed! in! terms! of! the! interaction! of! different!strategies,!which!represent! the!heterogeneity!of! forms!of!cooperation! in!civil!life.! The! model! uses! four! strategies,! adapted! from! Sugden’s! model! of!reciprocity! (2004):! N! (always! defect),! B! (a! trigger! strategy!which! begins! by!cooperating),!C! (a! trigger! strategy!which!begins!by!defection)!and!G! (always!cooperate).!!One!of!the!results!of!the!paper!is!the!conclusion!that!cooperation!is!favoured!by! heterogeneity:! the! presence! of! different! kinds! of! strategies! enhances!cooperation.!More!to!the!point,!the!model!shows!that!unconditional!actions!of!cooperation!(the!G!strategy)!can!be!essential!if!cooperation!is!to!establish!itself!in! populations! initially! characterised! by! generalised! non5cooperation;!unconditional! cooperation! acts! as! a! starter.! ! ! But,! at! the! same! time,!unconditional! actions! of! cooperation! should! not! be! too! frequent,! otherwise!they! become! counter5productive.! Although! the! latter! result! is! shared! with!Hoffmann! (1999),! who! runs! simulations! and! finds! a! turnover! between!
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cooperative! stages! and! non5cooperative! ones,! and!with! Sugden! (2004),!who!explains!this! turnover!by!means!of! ‘sleeper’!strategies2,!nevertheless!the!role!of!G!strategies!is!underestimated!in!the!previous!models.!Usually! G! strategies! are! considered! useless! or! even! detrimental! for! the!emergence! of! cooperation:! in!most! of! the! relevant! literature! they! are! called!‘sucker’! strategies.! ! (For! example,! Heller! and! Sieberg! (2010)! argue! that!cooperation!can!survive!without!the!existence!of!unconditional!co5operators).!In! our!model! they! are! essential! because! they! are! the! only! kind! of! strategies!which! can! activate! C.! In! Sugden’s! model,! ‘cautious! reciprocator’! strategies!(analogous! with! C)! can! be! activated! to! cooperate! by! ! ‘brave! reciprocator’!strategies!(analogous!with!B),!but!only!because!‘caution’!takes!a!sophisticated!form,!tailored!to!the!specific!punishment!behaviour!of!the!brave!strategy.!!But!the! point! of! view! of! Chapter! 2! is! different:! our! analysis! starts! from! the!assumption!that!G!behaviour!does!exist!in!society!(even!Binmore,!2006!admits!its!existence).!We! try! to!demonstrate! that!unconditional! cooperation!can!not!only!survive,!but!can!also!perform!a!role!in!fostering!cooperation.!!
3.! Team! reasoning:! a! theory! that! can! explain! cooperation! and!
coordination!Theories! of! team! reasoning! have! been! proposed! as! explanations! of!cooperation! and! coordination! in! games.! ! ! ! Different! general! formulations! of!team! reasoning! (or! ‘we5reasoning’)! have! been! proposed! by! David! Hodgson!(1967),!Donald!Regan!(1980),!Margaret!Gilbert!(1989),!Susan!Hurley!(1989),!Raimo!Tuomela! (1995,! 2007),! and!Martin!Hollis! (1998).!Within! this! body! of!literature,! Robert! Sugden! (1993,! 2000,! 2003)! and!Michael! Bacharach! (1995,!1997,!1999,!2006)!have!developed!game5theoretic!analyses.!The! key! idea! is! summarised! by! Bacharach! as:! “Roughly,! somebody! ‘team5reasons’! if! she!works!out! the!best! feasible! combination!of! actions! for! all! the!members!of!her! team,! then!does!her!part! in! it”! (Bacharach!2006,!p.! 121).! In!other!words,!when!people! team5reason!they!seek!an!answer!to! the!question:!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!2!Sleeper! strategies! are! strategies! whose! behaviour! is! indistinguishable! from! that! of! the!incumbent!strategy,!but!which!favour!certain!kinds!of!invaders!if!and!when!they!arrive.!In!this!case!the!sleeper!strategy!is!‘cautious!reciprocity’.!
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“What!should!we!do?”,!and!they!act!accordingly.!The!use!of!team!reasoning!can!explain! both! cooperation! in! a! PD! game! and! successful! coordination! in!coordination!games.!All! the!existing!theories!of!we5thinking!share!the! idea!that!each!member!of!a!set!of!individuals!who!are!engaged!in!a!strategic!interaction!can!!‘identify’!with!that!set!as!a! ‘group’.! !Each!member!of! the!group!then! ! tries!to!reach!the!best!outcome! for! the!whole!group,!doing! !his/her!part! in! the!best!combination!of!actions.! This! kind! of! reasoning! is! called! team! or! we5reasoning! and! it! is! the!effect!of!group!identification.!!!!!
3.1'Differences'in'theoretical'approaches'''Theories!of!we5reasoning!are!basically!divided! into!two!kinds!of!approaches:!some! scholars! consider! group! formation! as! rational,! others! do! not.! ! ! For!Bacharach,! for! example,! team! reasoning! is! a! result! of! a! psychological!mechanism! –! group! identification! 5;! for! Gilbert! (1989)! and! Tuomela! (1995)!group! formation! is! a! result! of! a! mutual! commitment;! Regan,! in! his!
Utilitarianism'and'Co9operation'(1980)!proposes!a!normative!theory!for!moral!and!rational!agents!in!which!the!rule!to!follow!is:!“What!each!agent!ought!to!do!is!to!cooperate,!with!whoever!else!is!cooperating,!in!the!production!of!the!best!consequences!possible!given!the!behaviour!of!non!cooperators”!(p.124).!!!!Susan!Hurley!offers!a!theory!of!‘rationality’!of!we5thinking.!Defining!the!unit!of!agency! as! “the! unit! the! causal! consequences! of! the! activity! of! which! are! in!question”! (1989,! p.140),! Hurley! identifies! as! units! the! subsystem! (‘each’)! or!the!system!(‘we’)!and!claims!that!those!units!have!not!to!be!taken!as!fixed.!In!fact,! facing!a!decision!problem!an!agent! firstly!must!ask!herself:!which! is! the!objective!in!this!situation?!Subsequently!she!can!choose!the!unit!of!agency!that!is!the!most!appropriate!for!the!objective:!“An!adequate!theory!should!help!us!to!understand!what!the!appropriate!unit!of!agency!is!in!various!circumstances”!(p.146).!The!consequence!of!this!analysis!is!that!it!is!rational!to!allow!different!units!of!agency,!hence!I5thinking!or!we5thinking!can!be!rational,!depending!on!the!circumstances.!!
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A! question,! however,! remains! open:! “If! units! of! agency! are! not! exogenously!fixed,!how!are!units!formed!and!selected?!Is!centralized!information!or!control!required,! or! can! units! emerge! as! needed! from! local! interactions?! At! what!points!are!unit! formation!and!selection!rationally!assessable?”! (2003,!p.165).!The! last! question! is! very! important,! because! the! fact! that! unit! formation! is!rational! has! still! to! be! demonstrated.! Hollis! and! Sugden! argue! that,! in!answering! the! question!whether! the! formation! of! a! unit! is! a! requirement! of!rationality:!“If!we!are!to!stay!at!all!close!to!account!of!rationality!that!derives!from!Hobbes,!Hume,!Bentham,!Pareto!and!Savage,!we!must!answer!‘No’!(Hollis!and!Sugden!1993,!p.!13)”.!!According!to!their!account!of!rational!choice!theory,!a!choice!is!rational!in!relation!to!the!desires!or!preferences!of!the!agent!who!is!making!the!choice:!“a!choice!can!be!rational!only!for!a!particular!agent”!(ib.).!It!follows!that!a!theory!of!rationality!cannot!give!an!account!of!the!formation!of!the!unit!of!agency.!!!!Differently!from!Hurley,!who!claims!that!there!must!be!agent5neutral!goals!to!be!pursued,!Elizabeth!Anderson!(2001)!takes!a!position!more!similar!to!that!of!Hollis! and! Sugden.! ! She! states! that! the! determination! of! personal! identity,!which! can! be! plural! or! individualistic,! precedes! the! choice! of! the! kind! of!reasoning!to!be!adopted.!She!makes!use!of!team!reasoning!in!order!to!give!an!account! of! the! ‘rationality! of! committed! action’:! “regarding! themselves! as!members!of!a!single!collective!agency,!the!parties!are!committed!to!acting!only!on! reasons! that! are! universalizable! to! their! membership”(p.29).! She! then!states!the!‘Priority!of!Identity!to!Rational!Principle’:!“what!principle!of!choice!it!is!rational!to!act!on!depends!on!a!prior!determination!of!personal!identity,!of!who! one! is”! (p.30).! Following! the! previous! principle,! Anderson! shows! that!either! acting! on!maximization! of! expected! utility! or! on! team! reasoning! is! a!rational! act,! depending! on! regarding! oneself! as! an! isolated! individual! or! a!member!of!a!team.!In!Anderson’s!account,!then,!the!determination!of!personal!identity!comes!before!the!decision!of!what!principle!of!choice!is!in!play.!Michael! Bacharach! offers! the!most! developed! theory! of! group! identification.!!Like!Hollis! and! Sugden,! Bacharach! treats! agency! as! prior! to! rationality.! ! His!theory! is! based! on! frames:! if! the! we5frame! comes! to! mind,! the! subject! will!group!identify!and!then!she!will!start!to!we5reason.!A!frame!can!be!defined!as!a!
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set! of! concepts! that! an! agent! uses! when! she! is! thinking! about! a! decision!problem.! It! cannot! be! chosen,! and! how! it! comes! to! mind! is! a! psychological!process:!“Her!frame!stands!to!her!thoughts!as!a!set!of!axes!does!to!a!graph;!it!circumscribes!the!thoughts!that!are!logically!possible!for!her!(not!ever!but!at!the! time).! In! a! decision! problem,! everything! is! up! for! framing…also! up! for!framing! are! her! coplayers,! and! herself”! (2006.! p.! 69).! In! Bacharach’s!framework,!then,!a!person!may!start!to!we5reason!only!if!she!has!‘we’!concepts!in!her! frame:! in!other!words,! a!person! firstly! recognizes! the!we5perspective,!and!then!endorses!it.!!!!Robert! Sugden! has! developed! a! different! framework! for! looking! at! the!problem.!In!his!framework,!the!central!concept!is!!‘common!reason!to!believe’:!people!who!group!identify!are!not!committed!to!reason!as!a!team!unless!there!is! a! common! reason! to! believe! that! other! agents! are! doing! the! same.! The!psychological!side!of!group!identification!in!Sugden’s!theory!might!be!found!in!his! analysis! of! Smith’s! ‘correspondence! of! sentiments’! (Sugden,! R.! 2005):!‘fellow5feeling’! could! be! seen! as! the! source! of! group! identification.! To!summarize,! in! Bacharach’s! framework! if! people! group! identify! they!automatically! start! to! reason! like!a! team,!whereas! in!Sugden’s! theory!people!may!group!identify,!but!team!reasoning!does!not!follow!automatically.!!!
3.2'The'I9we'equilibrium'My! approach! to!we5thinking,! which! is! explained! in! chapter! 3,! is! based! on! a!development!of!Bacharach’s!theory.!!Starting!from!a!detailed!review!of!Bacharach’s!writings,! I!aim!to!clarify!some!issues!linked!to!reasoning!and!frames,!and!then!to!build!a!framework!in!which!agents!are!allowed! to!have!both! I! and!we5! concepts! in! their! frames,! and! can!easily!switch!from!one!to!another.!!By! studying! Bacharach’s! published! and! unpublished! papers,! I! identify! a!limitation!in!his!theory:!Bacharach!cannot!allow!people!to!use!more!than!one!frame!at!a!time.!In!a!certain!sense,!as!it!has!been!noticed!by!Gold!and!Sugden!(Bacharach,! Gold! and! Sugden! 2006),! in! the! ‘we’! frame! people! become!committed!to!we5reason:!“In!the!theory!of!team!reasoning,!an!individual!who!
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reasons! in! the! ‘we’! frame! is! aware! of! the! ‘I’! frame! too! (as! one! ! that! other!players!might!use)!but!acknowledges!only!‘we’!reasons”!(p.199).!!The! approach! I! follow! shares! with! Hurley’s! theory! the! idea! that! the! unit! of!agency!cannot!be!considered!fixed,!but!not!the!idea!that!there!must!be!agent5neutral! goals! to! be! pursued:! in! my! account! the! agent! does! not! rationally!choose!the!unit!of!agency,!but,!with!the!help!of!reasoning,!he/she!can!vacillate!between! units.! The! notion! of! vacillation! between! frames! is! based! on!Bacharach’s!idea!that!frames!are!non5integrable!and!can!not!be!present!at!the!same!time!in!a!person.!The!image!Bacharach!uses!to!explain!this!concept!is!the!famous!Rubin’s!vase.!In!my!account!an!agent!starts!with!one!unit!of!agency!(I!or!we)!–!which!one! it! is!depends!on!psychological!considerations!or! framing!matters,!or!salience…!5!and!evaluates!what!is!the!best!to!do,!given!that!agency.!!!!In! particular,! if! the! agent! starts! by! I5reasoning,! he/she! asks! whether! ‘we’!would!be!better!off!by!deviating!from!I5reasoning.! !If,!instead!the!agent!starts!by!we5reasoning,!he/she!asks! if! ‘I’!would!be!better!off!by!deviating! from!we5reasoning.!With!the!help!of!this!process,!and!!by!defining!an!equilibrium!as!a!situation! in!which! there! is! no! incentive! to! deviate,! I! can! identify! I5equilibria!(from!which! ‘I’! have!no! incentive! to!deviate),!We5equilibra! (from!which! ‘we’!have!no! incentive! to!deviate),! and! I5We!equilibria,!which!are!consistent!with!both!I!and!we!reasoning.!In!my!account,!then,!as!in!Bacharach’s!account!there!exist! only! I5reasoning! and! we5reasoning,! without! a! higher5order! reasoning.!But,!differently! from!Bacharach,! I!allow!reasoning! to!have!some! influence!on!which!unit!of!agency!is!being!used.!!
4.!An!experiment!In! explaining! group! identification,! Bacharach! presents! his! interdependence'
hypothesis,!which!is!based,!among!other!things,!on!the!payoff!structure!of!the!game!being!played.!This!means!that,!according!to!Bacharach,!some!feature!of!the!games!can!enhance!team!reasoning.!!In!order! to!clarify! this! issue,! the! theoretical!model!presented! in!Chapter!3! is!followed!by!an!experiment,!reported!in!Chapter!4.!!
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The!experiment!aims!at! identifying!which!features!of!the!structure!of!payoffs!in! coordination! games! favour! the! use! of! team! reasoning,! using! Level5k!theories3!as!the!benchmark!for!the!modelling!of! individual!reasoning.!Level5k!theories! explain! coordination! in! games! avoiding! the! equilibrium! selection!problem:!they!anchors!players’!beliefs!on!the!behaviour!of!strategically!naïve!individuals,! who! are! supposed! to! play! randomly! or! to! choose! payoff! salient!strategies.!Level5k!and!team!reasoning!theories,!among!others,!have!been!used!to!explain!experimental! evidence! on! coordination! games.! Both! theories! succeed! in!explaining!some!results!and!both!fail!in!explaining!others!(e.g.!Crawford!et!al.,!2008;!Bardsley! et! al.,! 2010;! Isoni! et! al.,! 2012).! Sometimes! it! is! impossible! to!discriminate!between!them.!!A! way! to! explain! these! mixed! results! is! to! build! a! general! theory! of! group!identification,! which! could! explain! why! group! identification! occurs! in! some!games,! in!which!the!theory!of!team!reasoning!works,!but!not! in!other!games.!Bacharach! (2006),! Crawford! et! al.! (2008)! and! Bardsley! et! al.! (2010)! offer!conjectures!about!this,!but!they!do!not!propose!clear!hypotheses.!In! order! to! go! deeper! into! the! matter,! I! ! present! an! experiment! using! ‘pie!games’,! similar! to! those!used!by!Crawford!et! al.! (2008).! !Pie! games!are! two5player! coordination! games! in!which! all! payoffs! are! zero! except! on! the!main!diagonal;!payoffs!on!the!diagonal!can!differ!both!between!players!and!between!equilibria.! ! In!my!experiment,!each!game!has!three!strategies! for!each!player!and! therefore! three! pure5strategy! equilibria.! ! Two! of! these! equilibria! have!symmetrical!payoffs!(i.e.!if!one!equilibrium!has!the!payoffs!(x,!y),!the!other!has!(y,!x)).!!The!third!equilibrium,!which!I!call!‘unique’,!has!distinct!payoffs.!In!the!games!two!characteristics,!Pareto!dominance!and!equality!are!present!in!various!combinations,!and!the!equilibrium!with!distinct!payoffs! is!the!unique!‘we5solution’!for!each!game.!In!particular,!there!are!some!games!in!which!the!we5reasoning!solution!Pareto5dominates!the!other!two!equilibria!ex!post!(i.e.!given!that!both!players!have!coordinated!on!it),!and!there!are!other!games!in!which!the!we5solution!is!Pareto5dominated!by!the!other!equilibria!ex!post.!!(In!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!3!These!theories!will!be!explained!in!chapter!4.!
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all!our!games!the!we5solution!Pareto5dominates!the!other!choices!ex!ante!–!i.e.!on! the!assumption! that! the!players!cannot!coordinate!on!any!one!of! the! two!symmetrical!equilibria).!Secondly,!sometimes!the!we5solution!is!equal,!or!more!equal! than!the!other!two;!sometimes! it! is!unequal,!or!more!unequal! than!the!others.!!The! subjects! in! the! experiment! play! 11! games,! representing! all! possible!combinations! among! equality! and! Pareto5dominance.! The! aim! is! to! examine!how! these! features! work! in! predicting! choices! and! in! prompting! team!reasoning.!Our!conjectures,!related!to!the!characteristics!of!the!games,!are!that,!having! the!we5solution!as! an!equilibrium!which! is!Pareto5dominated!ex!post!by! the! others! might! discourage! team! reasoning,! and! the! same! will! happen!when! the! we5solution! is! unequal! or! more! unequal! compared! to! the! other!equilibria.!Conversely,!if!the!we5solution!Pareto5dominates!the!others!ex!post,!or! if! it! is! equal! or! more! equal! than! the! other! equilibria,! this! condition! will!enhance!team!reasoning.!!!In! the! experiment! there! are! 6! games! in! which! team! reasoning! and! level5k!predictions!disagree.!Our! results! confirm! our! conjectures,! showing! that! Pareto! dominance! and!equality!are!good!predictors!for!coordination!choices.!!We!find!mixed!evidence!about!level5k!and!team!reasoning!theories.!In!particular!team!reasoning!theory!fails!to!predict!choices!when!it!picks!out!a!solution!which!is!Pareto!dominated!and!not!compensated!by!greater!equality;level5k!theory!fails!in!games!in!which!it! predicts! the! choice! of! one! non5unique! equilibrium,! and! the! unique!equilibrium! is!more! equal! than! the! alternatives.! This! could! represent! a! step!forward! in! investigating! the!roles!of! team!reasoning!and! level5k!reasoning! in!explaining!coordinating!behaviour.!!!
5.!General!conclusions!from!my!work!At! the! end! of! this! long! path,! I! think! is! important! to! summarize!what! I! have!learned!from!my!work.!
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First!of!all!I!have!learned!that,!in!order!to!foster!cooperation,!it!is!important!to!take!into!account!the!role!of!unconditionally!cooperative!strategies,!and!not!to!underestimate! them.! Civil! life! teaches! us! that! sometimes! it! is! impossible! for!cooperation! to! be! sustained! unless! some! people! are! willing! to! keep!cooperating! even!when!no! one! else! does.! ! ! Chapter! 2! is! an! attempt! to! show!how!this!observation!can!be!represented!in!game!theory.!I! believe! I! have! made! a! contribution! to! the! foundations! of! team! reasoning!theory!by!introducing!the!possibility!that!a!person!can!switch!from!I5reasoning!to! we5reasoning! and! vice! versa,! guided! by! considerations! of! rationality!(reasoning!about!the!incentives!to!deviate!from!one!unit!of!agency!to!another)!and! not! only! by! psychology.! During! the! reviewing! process! for! publishing!Chapter! 2! I! learned! that! team! reasoning! is! something! so! obvious! and! at! the!same! time! so! strange! for! mainstream! economics! that! it! is! easily!misunderstood.!!More!effort!is!needed!in!order!to!build!a!more!general!theory!of! team!reasoning.!This! could! involve!enlarging! the! range!of!games! to!which!the!concept!of!I5we!equilibrium!can!be!applied,!included!dynamic!games.!The! experiment! shows! that! team! reasoning! does! exist,! and! that! it! is! not! so!‘exotic’!as!Gintis!(2003)!claims.!It!shows!also!that!sometimes!team!reasoning!is!used,! sometimes! not.! ! I! have!made! some! progress! in! identifying! conditions,!linked!to!the!payoff!structure!of!games,!which!favour!the!use!of!team!reasoning!in!coordination!games.!A!possible!line!of!development!could!be!to!use!games!in!which!it!is!possible!to!distinguish!between!strict!and!weak!Pareto!dominance,!in! order! to! study! in! a! better! way! the! effect! of! Pareto! dominance! on! team!reasoning.!!Another!useful!development!might!be!to!use!eye!tracker!tools!in!experiments,!in! order! to! identify! the! patterns! of! reasoning! used! by! the! subjects.! In!particular,!Bacharach!(2006)!claims!that!team!reasoners!compare!the!different!couples!of!payoffs!(my!payoff!and!my!partner’s!one).! !An!I5reasoner,! instead,!tries!to!find!his!best!responses!to!his!co5player’s!strategies,!and!to!find!her!best!responses!to!his!strategies.!!He!has!no!need!to!compare!his!payoffs!with!those!of!the!co5player.! !Thus!a!Row!player!makes!comparisons!between!his!payoffs!along! each! given! row,! and! between! the! co5players’! payoffs! down! each! given!
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1.!Introduction!Civil! life! is! essentially! cooperation.! Neoclassical! economics! offers! mostly! a!parsimonious!view!of!cooperation!merely!based!on! individual! self5interests!and! instrumental! rationality.! In! such! a! vision! of! cooperation,! an! agent!will!never!cooperate!in!a!one5shot!Prisoner!dilemma!game.!If!instead!the!game!is!repeated,! the! traditional! theory! justifies! the! cooperation! by! evoking! self5!interest!and/or!enforcement!(Binmore!2005,!2006).!In!reaction!to!this!parsi5!monious!view!of!cooperation,!recent!years!have!seen!development!of!a!body!of! literature! (mainly! experimental),! the! so5called! ‘social! preferences’! theo5!ries,!which!instead!seeks!to!explain!why!even!in!a!one5shot!non5cooperative!game! (i.e.! the! ‘ultimatum’! or! ‘trust’! game)! it! may! be! rational! to! play! ‘co5!operatively’.! The! explanation,! of! which! there! are! several! variants,! is! a! re5!definition! of! the! utility! function! of! the! agents,! by! introducing! non!material!payoffs!associated!to!norms!such!as!inequality!aversion!or!reciprocity.!In!this!way! it! is! possible! to! explain! the! emergence! of! cooperative! behaviour! in!contexts! where! the! standard! theory! would! exclude! it.! This! is! the! explana5!tion!of! cooperation!advanced!by!behavioural!economists! (see!Gintis! (2004)!and!Bowles!and!Gintis!(2004)),!who!base!their!analyses!of!cooperation!on!the!theory! of! strong! reciprocity! (Fehr! and! Gächter! (2000)).! By! ‘strong! reci5!procity’!they!mean!a!social!norm!which!rewards!those!who!behave!in!a!kind!way!and!punishes!those!who!behave!in!an!unkind!way.!This!theory!explains!the!emergence!of!cooperation!on!the!basis!of!a!form!of!altruism,!which!does!not! require! the! repetition! of! the! game.! In! this! paper! we! adopt! a! different!approach!for!explaining!the!emergence!of!cooperation!in!an!evolutionary!sce5!nario.! We! propose! a! pluralistic! and! multidimensional! view! of! cooperation!and!consequently!examine!aspects!hitherto!not!sufficiently!explored!by!eco5!nomic!and!social!theory.!In!particular,!the!intuition!inspiring!this!paper!is!the!
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!!!!It! can! be! easily! shown! that! both! players!will! choose! not! to! cooperate! or!defect! (D)! in! a! one5shot! game,! and! that! the! outcome! (0,0)! will! be! a! Nash!equilibrium.5!In! this! kind! of! non5iterated! game! cooperation! cannot! arise!unless!errors!are!committed!or!the!players!behave!irrationally.!Our! model! makes! use! of! repeated! games.! We! assume,! that! is! to! say,! that!associated!with! every! random!encounter! is! a! repeated! interaction!with! the!same!person.!This!interaction!may!be!of!greater!or!lesser!duration!according!to! a! parameter,! π,! which! denotes! the! discount! factor6.! We! are! hence! in! a!context!of!indefinitely!repeated!game.!After!a!series!of!interactions!with!the!same! person,! another! random! encounter! occurs,! and! the! (repeated)! game!resumes!with!another!(randomly!matched)!partner.!!!!The!structure!of!our!model! is!as! follows.!Time! is! continuous.!We!suppose!that!there!is!a!continuum!of!agents!belonging!to!a!particular!population,!and!that! they! must! choose! one! of! the! J! pure! strategies!{ }J,...,1 !whenever! they!interact! with! other! subjects! in! the! same! population.! The! subjects! are!distributed!among!I!sub5populations!{ }I,...,1 ,!which!are!assigned!exogenously!in! the! sense! that! existing! sub5populations! may! disappear! but! new! ones!cannot!be!created.!The!model’s! dynamic! is! described! by! standard! ‘replication’! equations.! The!replication! dynamic! is! widely! used! in! evolutionary! models,! which! assume!that! the! most! profitable! strategies! proliferate! in! the! population! at! the!expense!of!others.!Heckathorn!(1996)!describes!this!dynamic!well:!“Based!on!the!resulting!payoffs,!the!actors!with!the!most!successful!strategies!proliferate! at! the! expense! of! the! less! successful.! This! process! is! then!repeated,! generation! after! generation,! until! the! system! either! approaches!stable!equilibrium!or!cyclical!variation.”!(p.!261)!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5 !This! equilibrium! represents! a! dilemma! because! the! outcome! of! the! game! is! non5cooperation!when!each!player!individually!prefers!mutual!cooperation.!It!is!well!known!that!the! outcome! of! the! game! depends! essentially! on! two! assumptions! concerning! rationality!(individualism! and! instrumentality)! and! on! an! assumption! ! concerning! the! type! of!interaction!(anonymous).!6!Note!that!the!discount!factor!is!related!to!the!probability!that!the!game!will!continue!for!another!round.!See!Gintis!(2009),!p.!2025203.!
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This! dynamics! is! usually! employed! in! biology! to! study! the! evolution! of!species!on!the!basis!of!the!relative!fitness.!However,!in!social!sciences!there!is!a!different!interpretation!of!such!a!selection!process:!it!involves!learning!by!observing!and! imitating! the!behaviour!of!others.! In!what! follows,!we!adopt!neither!the!biological!analogy!nor!the!memetic!one!(i.e.!the!extension!of!gene5based!biological!evolution!to!meme5based!social!evolution).! Instead,!we!use!the!concept!of!‘expected!utility’!as!an!indicator!of!the!success!(not!necessarily!material)! of! a! strategy:! a! success! which,! over! time,! is! imitated! by! less!successful!strategies!(those!with!less!expected!utility).!! ! !The!dynamic!of!the!model!can!be!represented!by!the!replication!equations:!!
NiYYpp iii ,...,1      )( =−=! !! [1]!!where! p! denotes! the! proportion! of! subjects! for! each! subpopulation,! Y! the!average! payoff,! and! Yi' the! average! payoff! for! a! subject! belonging! to! the!subpopulation!i.!!!!The!dynamic!is!defined!on!the!invariant!simplex:!!!
∆= ! ∈ ℜ! , !! = 1,!! ≥ 0!!!! !!!!!We! shall! use! this! analytical! structure! to! analyse! the! evolutionary! process!that!arises! in!a!situation!where! there!are! two!pure!strategies,!C!and!D,!and!first!two,!then!three,!and!finally!four!subpopulations.!!We! are!well! aware! that! if! the! game! is! repeated,! the!possible! strategies! are!infinite.!We! consequently! restrict! our! analysis! to! four! strategies,!which!we!shall!call!(following!Sugden!2004)!B!(=!Brave)!and!C!(=!Cautious).!The!strategies!considered!are!therefore!the!following:!1.!N:! never! cooperate.!N! is! a! highly! important! strategy! because! analysis! of!cooperation! dynamics! becomes! non5banal! precisely! when! non5cooperation!scenarios!are!possible.!
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2.!G:!always!cooperate.!3.!B:! a! trigger! strategy,!which!prescribes:! cooperate!with! a!player!who!has!never!not!cooperated,!do!not!cooperate!with!any!other!player!who,!in!some!previous!round,!has!not!cooperated,!and!begin'by'cooperating.!In!other!words!a!player!using!B!strategy!will!cooperate,!but!as!soon!as!the!opponent!defects,!the!player!using!B!strategy!will!defect!for!the!reminder!of!the!game.!B!stands!for! ‘Brave’,! in! fact.!Bs!are!players!who!begin!by! cooperating! (and! therefore!risk! being! ‘exploited’! by! Ns! or! Cs! in! the! first! round).! But! if! in! the! second!round!they!do!not!receive!cooperation,!nor!will!they!cooperate.!4.! C:! this! trigger! strategy! has! the! same! structure! as! B,! the! only! difference!being! that! C! begins! by! not! cooperating.! The! description! is! then:! cooperate!with!a!player!who!cooperated!in!some!previous!round!and!who!has!never!not!cooperated,! do! not! cooperate! with! any! other! player! and! begin! by! not!cooperating.! If! these! cautious! types! are! to! cooperate,! they! must! have!obtained!cooperation!in!the!previous!round.!When!Cs!encounter!other!Cs!or!Ns,!they!never!cooperate.!An!immediate!consequence!ensues:!in!a!world!with!only!Cs!and!Ns,!cooperation!will!never!be!possible,!and!it!will!not!be!possible!to!distinguish!Cs!from!Ns!because!they!behave!in!exactly!the!same!way.!!If! we! use! cgbn pppp ,,, !to! denote! the! probabilities! of! encountering,!respectively,!an!N,!B,!G!or!C!type,!the!expected!utilities!in!a!world!with!these!four!possible!strategies!are:!!
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β ! ! [2]!!!An! N! type!will! never! cooperate! with! other! N! types! and!with! C! types! who!begin! by! not! cooperating! and! do! not! cooperate! if! the! other! player! did! not!cooperate!in!the!first!round,!whence! )0(np ,! )0(cp .!If!!the!N!type!encounters!a!B! type,!s/he!will!obtain!β! in! the! first! round!because!B!began!with!an!act!of!cooperation,!but!the!subsequent!payoffs!will!be!equal!to!0!because!B!will!stop!
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ppppU !! [4]!A!G! type!will! therefore!always! cooperate!with!Bs!and!with!Gs,! and!with!Cs!from!the!second!round!onwards,!while!Gs!will! let! themselves!be! ‘exploited’!by!Ns.!
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γπβ ! ! [5]!Finally,!a!C!type!will!not!cooperate!with!Ns!and!Cs,!and!s/he!will!cooperate!with!Gs!from!the!second!round!onwards.!With!Bs,!C!types!will!receive!β!in!the!first!round,!given!that!Bs!begins!with!an!act!of!cooperation,!and!(5!γ)! in!the!second!round.!From!the!third!round!onwards!Cs!will!obtain!0.!!!
3.!The!evolutionary!analysis!!In! order! to! analyse! the! evolution! in! dynamic! terms,! we! consider! three!strategies!at!a!time!(so!that!we!can!use!simplexes).!!!!After!the!first!game,!it! is! likely!that!the!proportion!of!players!adopting!the!winning!strategy!will!increase!in!future!pairings:!that!is,!the!winning!strategy!





8!The! payoff! ( )βπγ +−cp depends! on! the! fact! that! B! cooperates! the! first! time! and! C!responds!by!not!cooperating;!B!will!therefore!have!(5!γ),!but!C!will!cooperate!in!the!second!round,!because!B!has!cooperated!in!the!first.!From!the!third!round!onwards!the!payoff!will!be!0.!
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will! be! imitated!by!others.!This!will! be! the!basis! for! our!both! repeated'and'
evolutionary!analysis.!!!!!
!!!It!will!be!assumed!in!the!analysis!that! βγπ > .9!!








































Other! conditions! remaining! equal,! if! 1→π !–! so! that! the! likelihood! of!continuing! with! the! same! person! initially! encountered! is! very! high! –! the!point!shifts!towards!vertex!G.!This!result!strikes!us!as!important:!only!G!types!are!able!somehow!to!activate!Cs,!who!without!Gs!would!always!be!confined!to!a!world!of!non5cooperation.!The!following!proposition!therefore!holds:!!
Proposition'1.'In'a'world'in'which'the'types'or'strategies'N,'G,'C'are'present,'the'
replication' dynamic' has' two' different' outcomes:' a' combination' of' C' and' G'
(fixed'point'g)'only'if'pn'is'equal'to'0,'or'a'combination'along'the'line'of'fixed'
points'N,'C'(and'consequently'non9cooperation).'Without! the! presence! of! B! types! –! who! always! begin! with! an! act! of!cooperation! –! it! is! unlikely! that! virtuous! cooperation! mechanisms! will! be!triggered.!!




























f !!!!It!is!evident!that!if! 1→π ,!the!point!tends!to!shift!towards!the!N!vertex,!so!that! that! greater! the! probability! of! the! game! continuing,! the!more! likely! it!becomes!that!Bs!will!prevail!and!that!the!cooperative!outcome!will!occur.!In!a!world!without!G! types,! Cs! do! not! begin! to! cooperate.!We!may! say! that! the!sacrifice!of!the!Gs!somehow!restores!cooperation!potential!to!Cs,!for!without!their!presence!the!only!possible!form!of!cooperation!is!that!between!B!types.!To!be!noted!is!that!B!types!begin!with!an!act!of!cooperation.!In!their!absence,!a!non5cooperative!equilibrium!would!arise.!!




Proposition' 3.' In' a' world' in' which' the' strategies' N,' B,' G' are' present,' two'
equilibria'are'possible:'the'survival'of'only'types'N'and'a'coexistence'of'B'types'
and' G' types' along' the' line' of' fixed' points' on' the' B9G' side.'Which' of' the' two'
equilibria'will'come'about'depends'on'the'position'of'the'fixed'point'f'along'the'

























equilibrium!of!only!Ns;!vice!versa,!if!the!point!of!departure!is!to!the!right!of!the! trajectory,! the! outcome! will! be! a! coexistence! of! Bs! and! Gs.! Note! that!points! to! the! left! are! characterized,! amongst! other! things,! by! a! lower!percentage! of! Bs! than! of! Gs.! It! is! therefore! important! that! B! types! be!relatively! more! than! Gs! and! Ns! for! the! B5G! equilibrium! to! come! about.! In!short,!evident!here!is!the!delicate!role!of!G!strategies:!if!there!are!too!many!of!them,! they! foster! the! emergence! of! N! types! over! Bs.!Metaphors! aside,! in! a!population! where! non5cooperation! is! possible,! if! there! are! too! many!unconditional! acts,!not!only!are! they! likely! to!become!extinct,!but! they!will!also!extinguish!the!possibility!of!cooperation,!for!an!equilibrium!consisting!of!non5generalized!cooperation.!!!!!At! the! same! time,! the! coordinates! of! point! f! also! depend! on!β! and!γ.! The!value! of! γ! is! the! one! which! most! clearly! tells! us! what! the! social! rewards!structure! is.!A!high!γ!denotes!a!culture!which!penalizes!reciprocity,!while!a!high!(β9γ)!denotes!a!culture!which!rewards!it.!In!fact,!if!the!first!coordinate!is!high,!point! f! tends!to!N!(the!same!happens! if! the!second!coordinate! is! low),!while!if!it!is!low!f!tends!to!B.!!This!is!because!the!coordinate!of!N!is!directly!proportional!to!β:!while!both!coordinates!depend!on!(β9γ),!the!sign!of!γ!is!negative!in!the!coordinate!of!N!and!positive!in!the!coordinate!of!B.!This!tells!us!that!the!more!a!society,!
ceteris'paribus,!makes!reciprocity!of!G!and!B!type!costly,!the!more!likely!the!prevalence!of!non5cooperation!becomes.!!
4.#In#a#four+dimensional#world#!Thus!far!we!have!compared!three!strategies!at!a!time,!and!we!have!analysed!their! dynamic! evolution.! The! question! now! is! what! changes! if! the! four!strategies!N,!B,!G,!C!interact!simultaneously.!!In! the! four5strategies! case,! the! replication! dynamic! can! be! depicted! by! a!three5dimensional!simplex.:!!
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4.1.#Some#simulations#!!!!Which!of!these!equilibria!are!more!likely!depends!on!the!initial!conditions.!To! furnish!a! clearer! idea!of! the!dynamic,!we!now!report! some! simulations.!They!have!been!obtained!by!setting!various!initial!conditions!for!the!system.!We!assigned!the!following!values!to!the!parameters:!β!=!2,!γ!=!1,!π!=!4/5!
g 








!!!The! first! graph! shows! the! evolution! over! time! of! the! strategies!when! the!initial!conditions!state:!pn!=!pb!=!pg!=!pc!=!0.25.!!
!
!!In!this!case!the!final!equilibrium!is!of!the!B5G!type!where!the!proportion!of!G!is! very! small.! What! happens! if! we! change! the! initial! conditions?! The! next!graph!illustrates!a!situation!where!the!initial!proportions!are!pn!=!0.25,!pb!=!0.25,!!pg!=!0.1!!pc!=!0.4.!We!have!left!the!proportions!of!B!and!G!unaltered,!but!we!have!increased!Cs!with!respect!to!Gs.!!!













!!!Interestingly,!a!greater!proportion!of!Cs,!although! it!does!not! improve!their!chances!of!‘survival’,!helps!the!development!of!Gs,!which!in!this!case!remain!constant! over! time.! We! saw! in! section! 3.1.1! that! only! G! types! are! able! to!activate!Cs;!we!may!now!state!that!Cs!are!essential!for!the!survival!of!Gs.!The!importance!of! the! role!performed!by!Cs! (which! in! the! three5strategy!world!seemed!almost!irrelevant)!also!emerges!from!the!following!graph,!which!has!been!constructed!with!the!following!initial!proportions:!pn!=!0.4,!pb!=!0.3,!!pg!=!0.1!!pc!=!0.2.!!In!this!case!the!Ns!are!initially!in!a!greater!proportion!than!Bs,!and!there!are!more!Cs!than!Gs.!!!











!!!Figure!2.7:!evolution!over!time!with!pn!=!0.4,!pb!=!0.3,!pg!=!0.10!pc!=!0.20!!!!Hence,! cooperation!may!prevail! even! if! there!are! initially!more!Ns! than!Bs,!provided!that!there!is!a!sufficient!number!of!Cs.!!!!!
5.!conclusions!!Now!we!may!draw!some!conclusions,!that!can!be!summarised!as!follows.!!(a) The'‘crucial’'role'of'G'types.!We!have!seen!at!various!points!in!our!analysis!that! G! types! should! not! be! too! numerous,! because! if! they! are! they!compromise! themselves! and! also! the! survival,! for! example,! of! Bs.! In!populations!where!non5cooperation! is!possible! (which! is! the! case!of! all!real!ones),!unconditional!acts!are!essential,!but!when!too!numerous,!they!become!counter5productive.!(b) G!types!perform!a!vital!role,!for!only!they!can!activate!the!cooperation!of!Cs.! Without! the! presence! of! G! types,! Cs! would! never! experience!cooperation! and! therefore! would! never! respond! with! an! act! of!cooperation.! G! types! are! consequently! valuable,! but! they! should! be!











protected.!The!success!of!numerous!forms!of!cooperation!–!from!firms!to!families! –! depends! also,! and! sometimes! above! all,! on! the! presence! of! a!small!number!of!unconditional!reciprocators!able!to!activate!people!who!would! never! be! so! activated! if! they! only! interacted! with! conditional!cooperators.!(c) Alliances:'C'types.!These!are! ‘activated’!by!Gs,!but!at!the!same!time!their!presence! is! highly! beneficial! to! Gs! because! it! increases! their! expected!utility.!Gs,! in! fact,!cooperate!with!Bs!and!with!Cs,!but!they!are!exploited!by!Ns.!In!a!four5strategy!world,!Cs!protect!the!Gs!against!extinction.!Cooperation!is!therefore!favoured!by!heterogeneity.!!!!From!a!mathematical!point!of!view,!it!might!be!objected!that!G!types!are!not!necessary.! The! onset! of! cooperation! would! only! require! slightly! more!sophisticated!Bs10.!But!this!was!not!the!purpose!(i.e.!to!study!which!strategies!favour!cooperation)!for!which!the!model!was!conceived.!Our!analysis!started!from! the!assumption! that!behaviours! like!G!exist! in! civil! society.! (And!who!could! deny! the! presence! in! the! real! world! of! unconditional! actions?! Even!Binmore! (2006)!with! his! orthodoxy! and! anthropological! parsimony! admits!their! existence).! Our! model! has! sought! to! analysis! the! conditions! under!which!unconditional!actions!can!not!only!survive!but!also!perform!a!virtuous!civil!role.!!!!!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!10!Note!that!if!we!use!Tit5fot5tat!strategies!instead!of!trigger!strategies!for!B!and!C!the!results!do!not!change.!The!expected!utility!for!B!when!he!meets!C!will!be!–!!!"!!!! !instead!of!– ! + !"!and!the!expected!utility!for!C!when!he!meets!B!will!be!!!!"!!!! !instead!of!! − !".!This!does!not!affect!the!resulting!equilibria.!
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Appendix(1."Mathematical"proofs!
Proof#of#proposition#1:##!The!expected!utilities!are:!!!! = !! 0 + !! 0 + !! !1− ! !!! = !! 0 + !! 0 + !! ! − !"1− ! !!! = !! −!1− ! + !! !" − !1− ! + !! ! − !1− ! !!!The!matrix!of!payoffs!is:!! 0 0 !1− !0 0 ! − !"1− !−!1− ! !" − !1− ! ! − !1− !
!
!Adding!a!constant!to!each!column!of!A!does!not!change!the!dynamics,!so!we!subtract!the!first!row:!!!! 0 0 00 0 −!"1− !−!1− ! !" − !1− ! −!1− ! !!We!know!that:!! > ! > 0!!Following!!Bomze!(1983),!proposition!1!(p.!210)!!:!1. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!N!in!direction!N5C!is!equal!to!0!2. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!N!in!direction!N5G!is!proportional!to! !!!!!!,!and!then!is!negative!3. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!C!in!direction!C5N!is!equal!to!0!4. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!C!in!direction!C5G!is!proportional!to!!!"!!!!! ,!then!is!positive!(we!have!supposed!that!!! > !!!!)!5. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!G!in!direction!G5C!is!proportional!to!!!!"!!! !!!!!!!and!then!is!positive!
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6. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!G!in!direction!G5N!is!proportional!to! !!!!!!,!and!then!is!positive.!!Following!proposition!2!(p.!210)!we!know!that!N5C!is!pointwise!fixed.!!Proposition!5!(p.!211)!tells!us!that!there!exists!a!fixed!point!g!(saddle!point)!on!the!side!G5C,!in!fact!the!quantity!(e'–'b)(f'–'c)!is!negative,!and!the!eingenvalues!associated!to!the!fixed!point!are!proportional!to:!1.(!!!)(!!!)!!!!!!! ,!that!means!– !"!!!!! !!!"!!!!"!!"!!! !:!this!quantity!is!negative;!!2. !"!!"!!!!!!!,!that!is!positive.!!
Proof#of#proposition#2:##
#Expected!utilities:!!! = !! 0 + !! 0 + !! ! !!! = !! 0 + !! 0 + !! ! − !" !!! = !! 0 + !! 0 + !! ! − !1− ! !Matrices:!! 0 0 !0 0 ! − !"−! !" − ! !!!!!! !and!!!
0 0 00 0 −!"−! !" − ! !"!!!!! !!!!1. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!N!in!direction!N5C!is!equal!to!0!2. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!N!in!direction!N5B!is!proportional!to!!−!,!!and!then!is!negative!3. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!C!in!direction!C5N!is!equal!to!0!4. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!C!in!direction!C5G!is!proportional!to!!" − !,!and!then!is!positive!!5. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!B!in!direction!B5C!is!proportional!to!!!!!"!!!!"!!!!!!! !and!then!is!negative!6. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!B!in!direction!B5N!is!proportional!to!!!!"!!! ,!and!then!is!negative!!Following!proposition!2!(p.!210)!we!may!say:!5 the!side!N5C!is!pointwise!fixed!5 On!the!side!N5B!there!exists!an!unique!fixed!point!f;!the!eigenvalues!of!f!are!positively!proportional!to:!!!!!(positive)!!
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!!(!!")(!!)!"!!!!! !!(negative).!!The!fixed!point!has!coordinates(Bomze!1983,!p.!204):!!!! = 11+ !!"!!!!! = !" − !! − ! !!!!! = 0!!!! = ! 1− !! − ! !!!We!know!that!do!not!exist!fixed!points!on!the!side!C5B!(prop.!5)!and!that!do!not!exist!internal!fixed!points!(prop.6).!!
Proof#of#proposition#3:#Expected!utilities:!!!! = !! 0 + !! ! + !! !1− ! !!! = !! −! + !! ! − !1− ! + !! ! − !1− ! !!! = !! −!1− ! + !! ! − !1− ! + !! ! − !1− ! !!!Matrices:!! 0 ! !!!!−! !!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!! !!!!!! ,!and!
0 0 00 !"!!!!! !!!!!!!!!! !!!!!! !!!!! !!!1. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!N!in!direction!N5B!is!proportional!to!−!!and!then!is!negative!2. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!N!in!direction!N5G!is!proportional!to! !!!!!!!!!and!then!is!negative!3. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!B!in!direction!B5N!is!proportional!to!− !"!!!!! !and!then!is!negative!4. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!B!in!direction!B5G!is!equal!to!zero!!5. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!G!in!direction!G5B!is!equal!to!zero!6. the!eigenvalue!of!the!corner!G!in!direction!G5N!is!equal!to!! !!!!,!and!then!is!positive!!
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1.!Introduction!The! idea! of! team.thinking! or! we.thinking! is! increasingly! drawing! the!attention! of! scholars.! In! its! general! formulation,! it! has! been! proposed! by!David! Hodgson! (1967),! Donald! Regan! (1980),! Margaret! Gilbert! (1989),!Susan! Hurley! (1989),! Raimo! Tuomela! (1995,! 2007),! and! Martin! Hollis!(1998).!Within! this! body! of! literature,! Robert! Sugden! (1993,! 2000,! 2003)!and! Michael! Bacharach! (1995,! 1997,! 1999,! 2006 11 )! have! developed!analytical! frameworks! from! an! economic! point! of! view.! We.thinking!theories! allow! groups! to! deliberate! as! agents.! A! central! concept! in! these!theories!is!what!has!been!called!team%reasoning:!“Roughly,!somebody!’team.reasons’!if!she!works!out!the!best!feasible! combination! of! actions! for! all! the! members! of! her!team,!then!does!her!part!in!it”!(Bacharach!2006,!p.!121).!In! other! words,! when! people! we.reason! they! seek! an! answer! to! the!question:!“What!should!we!do?”,!and!they!act!accordingly.!!The!main!claim!of!scholars!who!analyze!we.thinking!is!that!it!is!a!coherent!mode!of!reasoning!people!may!use!when!they!face!a!decision!problem!of!a!certain!type.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!11!The! 2006! book! was! published! after! Bacharach’s! death.! The! editors,! Natalie! Gold! and!Robert! Sugden,! assembled! all! the! existent! materials! Bacharach! intended! to! put! into! the!book! and! added! their! own! discussion! of! Bacharach’s! plans! for! the! chapters! that! were!uncompleted!when!he!died.!!
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We.thinking! theories! have! been! introduced! into! the! economic! domain! for!both!theoretical!and!empirical!reasons.!!First! of! all,! we.thinking! theories! account! for! the! relational! nature! of!humankind!(see Sugden!2005,!Bruni!2008,!and!Davis!2009).!As!Hollis!puts!it:!“we!need!a!more!social!conception!of!what!persons!are!and!a!role.related!account! of! the! obligations! which! make! the! social! world! go! round! and!express!our!humanity”!(Hollis!1998,!p.!104).!!Secondly,! team! reasoning! helps! to! solve! some! puzzles! that! arise! in! game!theory,! especially! linked! to!Hi.Lo12 and! one.shot! Prisoner’s! Dilemma! (PD)!games,! in! which! rational! choice! theory! cannot! explain! selection! of! the!Pareto.superior!equilibria!or!cooperation13.!We! thinking! is! also! a!way! to! explain! how!people! can! coordinate! on! ’focal!point’! equilibria:! focal! points! have! been! introduced! by! Schelling! (1960),!they! are! particular! Nash! Equilibria! on! which! the! players’! expectations!converge.! Team! reasoning! offers! an! explanation! of! coordination! on! focal!points,! which! has! been! tested! by! Bacharach! and! Bernasconi! (1997),!Barsdley!et!al.!(2010),!and!Crawford!et!al.!(2008).!!Finally,! team! reasoning! can! also! explain! experimental! and! empirical!evidence! on! how! people! behave! in! other! games! and! decision! contexts.!Experimental! evidence! shows! that,! especially! in! some! kinds! of! games,!people!do!endorse!we.thinking14.!In!particular!Colman!et.!al.!(2008),!making!use! of! likelife! vignettes! and! abstract! games,! show! evidence! for! team!reasoning,!as!a!good!predictor!of!strategy!choices.!!Nevertheless! there! are! different! opinions! about! the! way! in! which! we.thinking! arises! and! how! it! brings! people! to! behave! in! a! particular! way.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12!The!Hi.Lo!game!is!in!general!a!n!player!game!in!which!each!player!chooses!one!item!from!the! same! set! of! alternatives.! Each! alternative! is! associated! with! a! prize,! and! one!alternative’s!prize!is!greater!than!the!others.!If!all!players!choose!the!same!alternative!they!get!the!associated!prize,!if!not!nobody!gets!anything.!!13!Bacharach!2006!(pp.!44.58)!refers!to!the!most!relevant!models!that!have!faced!this!issue,!explaining! why! a! new! theory! is! needed;! Colman! (2008)! explains! how! team! reasoning!provides! a! justification! for! choosing! payoff.dominant! equilibria,! a! concept! introduced! by!Harsanyi!and!Selten!(1988).!!14!See!Guala!et!al.!(2009),!Becchetti,!Faillo,!Degli!Antoni!(2009),!and!Tan!and!Zizzo!(2008)!for!a!review!of!experiments.!
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Different!authors!have!proposed!different!conceptual!analyses!of!the!issue,!with!no!general!agreement!among!them15.!Among! the! few! scholars! who! have! proposed! formal! approaches! to!illustrating! how! we.thinking! arises,! Bacharach! offered! one! of! the! most!developed!theories!from!the!game!theoretic!point!of!view16.!He!proposes!a! formal! theory!of!games!with! I.reasoners!and!we.reasoners,!with! the! mode! of! reasoning! taken! as! given.! A! fundamental! point! in!Bacharach’s! theory! is! that! the! determination! of! mode! of! reasoning! is! a!psychological!matter,!prior!to!rational!choice,!and!is!given!by!frames.!So,!as!he! recognizes,! to! complete! the! theory! he! needs! to! build! a! theory! which!explains!which!mode!of!reasoning!will!be!in!play.!This!means!to!endogenize!I/we! determination.! This! part! of! Bacharch’s! theory! is! less! developed,!although! he! suggests! some! intuitions,! not! always!mutually! consistent! and!not!fully!developed.!He!tries!to!complete!his!theory!following!two!different!approaches:!the!concept!of!the!harmony!of!the!game,!which!has!been!further!developed! by! Tan! and! Zizzo17!,! and! the! interdependence%hypothesis,%which!links! to! an! underdeveloped! intuition! about! vacillation! between! frames.!Because! of! his! premature! death,! which! occurred! unexpectedly,! he! never!achieved! his! aim! of! endogenising! the! determination! of! the! mode! of!reasoning.!!In!the!present!paper,!I!shall!suggest!a!way!to!complete!Bacharach’s!theory,!generalising!the!interdepence!hypothesis!and!building!on!his!intuition!about!vacillation.! I!propose!a! formal!model!of!vacillation!between! frames,!which!allows!individuals!to!switch!from!I!to!we!mode!of!reasoning!and!vice!versa!(section!4!and!5).!It!is!a!simple!model!based!on!an!intuition!that!Bacharach!expressed!but!did!not! fully!develop,! concerning!double.crossing! in! the!PD!game.! In! order! to! develop! my! proposal,! Bacharach’s! theory! of! team.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!15!See!the!chapter!1!for!a!review!of!team!reasoning!theories.!!16!Of! course!Bacharach! is! not! the! only! theorist!who! has! adressed! team! reasoning! from! a!game.theoretic! point! of! view:! among! theorists! who! use! team! reasoning! or! related!principles,! such! as! ’principle! of! coordination’,! for! explaining! focal! points,! Sugden! (1995),!Casajus!(2000),!and!Janssen!(2001,!2006)!make!use!of!game!theory;!Zizzo!(2004)!and!Zizzo!and!Tan!(2003)!do!so! introducing!a! ’game!harmony’!measure.!Nevertheless,!Bacharach! is!the!only!one!who!tries!to!explain!the!emergence!of!team!reasoning!using!game!theory.!17!See!Zizzo!and!Tan!(2007),!Tan!and!Zizzo!(2008).!!
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reasoning!will!be!analysed!in!section!2,!by!taking!into!account!published!and!unpublished!material.! In!section!3!I!propose!a!discussion!of!some!not!fully!developed!intuitions!of!Bacharach,!and!section!6!presents!the!conclusions.!!!
2.!Bacharach’s!theory!of!we7thinking!“The! answers! to! fundamental! questions! about! coordination!and! cooperation…! lie! in! the! agent’s! conception! not! of! the!objects!of!choice,!nor!of!the!consequences,!but!of!herself!and!of! the! agents! with! whom! she! is! interacting”! (Bacharach!2006,!p.!70).!!This!sentence!is!the!starting!point!of!Bacharach’s!analysis!of!we.reasoning.!We.reasoning!is!seen!as!a!powerful!‘mechanism’!(in!Bacharach’s!words)!for!solving! puzzles! about! coordination! and! cooperation! in! game! theory! (i.e.!games!like!Hi.Lo!and!PD).!In!his!work!Bacharach!tries!to!demonstrate!that!we.reasoning!is!a!valid!mode!of!reasoning!and!that!people!do!endorse!it18.!Bacharach’s! main! purpose! is! to! explain! cooperation,! seen! as! a! successful!group! activity! (ib! p.! 69),! and! the! core! mechanism! for! doing! that!comprehends!‘framing’,!‘common!purpose’,!and!‘cooperation’:!!“(i)! we! frame! ourselves! as! members! of! groups;! (ii)!…perceived!agreement!of!individual!goals!among!a!set!of!individuals!favours!framing!as!members!of!a!group!with!this!common!goal;!(iii)!the!group!framing!tends!to!issue!in!efficient!cooperation!for!the!group!goal”!(ib!p.!90).!In!what! follows,! I! illustrate! the!building!blocks!of!Bacharach’s! theory,!but,!first!of!all,!I!give!an!account!of!how!and!when!Bacharach!developed!the!idea!of! we.thinking.! This! is! because! the! particular! pattern! he! followed! could!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!18!Bacharach! claims! that! there! are! five!kinds!of! evidence! in! support! of! this! claim:! logical,!introspective,! evolutionary,! transcendental! and! experimental.! In! particular! he! gives! an!account!of!two!experiments,!one!conducted!by!himself!and!Guerra,!and!the!other!by!himself!and!Bernasconi,!which!provide!some!behavioural!evidence!that!group! identification! leads!people! to!we.reasoning!(see!Bacharach!2006,!pp.145.146,!and!Bacharach!and!Bernasconi!1997).!!
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offer! hints! for! developing! some! of! his! intuitions,! remaining! faithful! to! his!thought.!!
 
2.1.%Development%of%Bacharach’s%thought%Bacharach! started! by! building! Variable! Frame! Theory! (Bacharach! 1993),!when!in!parallel!he!was!developing!a!theory!of!cooperation.!Variable!Frame!Theory!(VFT)!is!an!analysis!of!choices! in!games!in!which!frames!are!taken!into! account.! VFT! allows! games! with! descriptions! of! players’! frames.!Concisely,! in!VFT!a!player!can! intentionally!choose!an!object,!or!an!action,!only!if!she!has!a!way!of!thinking!about!that!object!or!that!action,!i.e.!she!has!a! frame! in!which! it! is! represented.! Frames! can! be!more! or! less! salient! or!available,!depending!on!a!probability!measure!on!them.!!Bacharach’s!aim!in!developing!VFT!was!to!explain!the!choice!of!focal!points!in!games:!by!making!use!of!VFT!he!could!turn!focal!point!problems!into!Hi.Lo!games.!We.thinking! theory,!as!proposed!by!Sugden!(1993),!helped!him!to! explain! the! selection! of! Pareto.superior! equilibria! in! Hi.Lo! and! in!coordination! games! more! generally.! He! started! then,! to! develop! his! own!theory!of!we.reasoning.!!In!1995!he!introduced!the!category!of!‘fellow!member!reasoner’:!!“Someone! who! is! a! member! of! a! natural! type! T! and!chooses! a! certain! strategy! if! she! is! sufficiently! sure! that!her!interactants!are!also!member!of!T”!(1995,!p.1).!In!this!context!he!tries!to!link!T.membership!to!VFT!and,!at!the!same!time!he!introduces!the!‘we’!category:!!“The! present! paper! has!made! type! T!membership! an! issue!which! type! T! members! think! about,! and! nuanced! their!capacity! to! recognize! it.! An! alternative! development!would!make!T!membership!a!variable!element!in!players’!frames!in!the!sense!of!variable!frame!theory:!that!is,!a!player!might!or!might!not!think!about!the!game!in!terms!of!whether!she!and!her!coplayers!belong!to!T.!In!the!case!in!which!T!is!the!player!
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set,!we!may!put!this!by!saying!that!a!player!may!or!may!not!think! in! ‘we’! terms! about! how! to! play! the! game.! The!more!inclined! a! player! is! to! ‘we’! thinking,! and! the!more! inclined!she! takes! coplayers! to! be,! the! more! will! fellow.member!reasoning!be!favoured”!(p.17).!In! 1997! Bacharach! formally! introduces! we.thinking,! in! an! unpublished!paper! whose! title! is:! “’We’! Equilibria:! A! Variable! Frame! Theory! of!Cooperation”.!The! first!published!paper! in!which!Bacharach! formalizes!his!theory!is!an!article!published!in!1999!about!’interactive!team!reasoning’.!In!it!Bacharach!introduces!some!elements!that!we!can!find!in!the!book,!such!as!group! identification,! team! reasoning! as! the! effect! of! group! identification,!and!unreliable! team! interaction! (which! in! the!book!becomes!cirscumspect!team!reasoning).!Between!the!1999!article!and!the!book!we!may!find!some!lecture! notes,! in!which! the! concepts! of! agency! and! ‘superagency’! begin! to!appear.!The!book!represents!an!(incomplete,!because!of!his!death) attempt!to!build!a! complete,! and!at! the! same! time!simple,! theory!of!we.thinking:! I!shall! present! in! the! following! subsections! the! theory! as! it! appears! in! the!book.!!!
2.2.%I=reasoning%and%we=reasoning%First! of! all,! Bacharach! allows! for! the! existence! of! both! I! and!we!modes! of!reasoning.! Each! is! seen! as! rational! maximization! of! a! von! Neumann! .!Morgenstern! utility! function.! I.reasoning! is! represented! by! a! standard!utility!function.!We.reasoning,!instead,!requires!a!team!utility!function!(W!):!“a! game.theoretic! treatment! of! agents! who! may! group.identify! must...!determine! a! payoff! function! to! represent! the! group! objective”! (Bacharach!2006! p.! 87)19.! In! order! to! clarify! what! the! group! identification! process!implies!about!what!the!players!want!as!a!group,!or,!in!other!words,!in!order!to! clarify! what! W! is,! Bacharach! proposes! that! W! must! satisfy! the!'Paretianness'!condition:!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!19!In!a!previous!article!Bacharach!said:!“Our!theory!takes!the!line!that!collections!of!people!can!have!objectives”!(1999,!p.!120).!!
!! 48!
if!a!profile!of!actions!p!is!weakly!Pareto.superior!to!p’%then! ! ≥! !′ .!This!requires!that!group!objectives!are!related!to!personal!ones.!Examples!of! group! utility! functions! include! the! utilitarian! function! and! weighted!utilitarian!functions.!According!to!Bacharach,!the!most!commonly!used!form!of! group! utility! function! is! the! mean! of! the! individual! payoff20.! Another!important! point! for! Bacharach! is! to! allow! principles! of! symmetry! and!fairness!between!individual!payoffs21 to!be!embedded!in!W.!!!!!
2.3.%Frames%%%For!Bacharach,!modes!of! reasoning!are!not! chosen! rationally.!The!process!by!which!a!mode!of!reasoning!comes!into!play!is!based!on!frames:!if!the!we.frame!comes!to!mind,!the!subject!will!group!identify!and!then!she!will!start!to!we.reason.!A!frame!can!be!defined!as!a!set!of!concepts!that!an!agent!uses!when! she! is! thinking! about! a! decision! problem.! It! cannot! be! chosen,! and!how!it!comes!to!mind!is!a!psychological!process:!!!!“Her!frame!stands!to!her!thoughts!as!a!set!of!axes!does!to!a!graph;! it! circumscribes! the! thoughts! that! are! logically!possible! for! her! (not! ever! but! at! the! time).! In! a! decision!problem,! everything! is! up! for! framing...! also!up! for! framing!are!her!coplayers,!and!herself”!(ib.!p.!69).!!!!In!Bacharach’s! framework!a!person!may!start!to!we.reason!only! if!she!has!‘we’!concepts!in!her!frame.!If!the!we.frame!is!active!in!a!subject!she!begins!to! think!of!herself! as! a!part!of! a! collective!actor,! then! she!begins! to! team.think,!and!this!means!that!in!the!face!of!a!decision!problem!she!will!answer!the!question:!“What!shall!we!do?”.!In!Bacharach's!theory!then,!to!see!the!we.frame!implies!to!endorse!that!frame.!!!In!his!theory!group!identification!is!a!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20!See!Bacharach!1999,!p.!126.!In!order!to!derive!group!utility!functions!from!the!individual!ones,!interpersonal!comparisons!are!required.!Bacharach!is!implicitly!assuming!that!these!are! possible.! Interpersonal! comparisons! do!not! affect! the!way! in!which!players! play,! but!they!are!required!to!construct!the!we.utility! function.!For!a!discussion!of!properties!of!W!see!Gold!(2012).!21!“Such!as!those!of!Nash's!axiomatic!bargaining!theory”(Bacharach!2006,!p.!88).!
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framing! phenomenon! that! determines! choices! by! “changing! the! logic! by!which! people! reason! about! what! to! do”! (ib).! When! reasoning! in! the!individual! standard! mode! (I.reasoning),! an! agent! looks! at! a! decision!problem! by! thinking! what! it! would! be! best! for! her! to! do.! Group!identification!changes!this!logic!to!we.reasoning:!the!agent!will!think:!“What!would!best!be!for!us!to!do?”.!!!!!
2.4.%Circumspect%team%reasoning%%%%One!of!Bacharach’s!aims!is!to!explain!situations!in!which!some!people!may!we.reason!and!some!others!may!not.!In!order!to!model!these!situations,!he!assumes! that! the! 'we'! frame! comes! to! mind! with! probability! ω,! which!represents!the!probability!that!a!subject!group.identifies.!The!probability!ω!is! common! knowledge! amongst! team! members22:! “in! coming! to! frame! a!situation!as!a!problem! ‘for!us’,!an! individual!also!gains!some!sense!of!how!likely! it! is! that! another! individual!would! frame! it! in! the! same!way”! (ib! p.!163).!A!context!in!which!some!people!may!group.identify!and!some!may!not!is! seen! by! Bacharach! as! an! unreliable! coordination! context,! and! team!reasoning! in! this! context! is! called! circumspect! team! reasoning.! Briefly,!people! who!we.reason! in! an! unreliable! coordination! context! look! for! the!best! available! profile! o! .! the! combination! of! actions! .! that! maximizes!W!given!that!each!person!will!choose!to!do!her!part!in!o!with!probability!ω,!or!will! fail! .! i.e.! act! on! I.reasoning! .! with! probability! (1.! ω).! ! ! One! problem!which! remains! open! in! Bacharach's! theory! is! the! endogenization! of!ω:! he!sees! the! need! for! endogenization! and!proposes! some! speculations,! but! he!did!not!complete!this!part!of!the!theory,!as!we!shall!see!later.!!
2.5.%Variable%Frame%Theory%and%'vacillation'%%%Bacharch’s! (never! reached)! aim! was! to! explain! we.reasoning! in! terms! of!Variable!Frame!Theory!(VFT).!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!22!In!a!previous!work!(1999),!Bacharach!has!developed!a!more!formalized!model,!in!which!each! agent! can! participate! or! lapse! in! a! team! and! everyone,! before! choosing,! receives! a!signal! knowing! the! joint! probability! distribution! of! this! signal! and! agent’s! state! (i.e.! an!agent’s!signal!includes!her!participation!state).!
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The! intersection!between!VFT!and!we.thinking!would!have!been!called!by!Bacharach! ‘Variable!Agency!Theory’! (Bacharach!2006,!p.59).!However,! the!completion! of! the! description! of! we.reasoning! in! terms! of! VFT! raised!problems! that!he!had!not! solved!at! the! time!of!his!death.!Let!us! see! these!problems.!!!In!Bacharach’s!circumspect!team!reasoning,!as!I!have!said!before,!if!people!group!identify,!then!the!we.frame!comes!to!their!mind!and!they!start!to!we.reason.! It! seems! as! though! in! Bacharach’s! framing! theory! there! are! two!aspects! that! are! deeply! linked:! in! framing! a! situation,! the! first! step! is! to!recognize!a!frame,!that!is,!coming!to!see!it;!the!second!step!is!endorsing!that!frame,! that! is,! reasoning! as! the! frame! allows! you! to! do.! In! Bacharach’s!theory!group!identification!means!not!only!coming!to!see!a!particular!way!of!reasoning,!but!also!endorsing!it.!The!‘compression’!between!the!two!aspects!of! framing! is! due! to! VFT.! However,! in! the! original! form! of! VFT,! changing!frame! does! not! mean! to! change! the! way! of! reasoning,! and! the! decision!problem!for!a!subject!is!fully!determined!by!the!interplay!of!his!frame!and!the! objective!world.! VFT!was! originally! thought! of! as! a!way! to! allow! of! a!player!to!frame!different!situations!differently,!but!frames!were!not!related!to!different!agencies.!In!constructing!his!Variable!Agency!Theory,!Bacharach!was!trying!to!use!VFT!in!a!new!way,!but,!because!of! this! ‘compression’,!he!could!not!allow!people! to!use!more! than!one! frame!at! a! time.! In!a! certain!sense,!as!it!has!been!noticed!by!Gold!and!Sugden!(in!Bacharach!2006),!in!the!we.frame!people!become!committed!to!we.reasoning:!!!!“In!the!theory!of!team!reasoning,!an!individual!who!reasons!in! the! ‘We’! frame! is! aware! of! the! ‘I’! frame! too! (as! one! that!other! players! might! use)! but! acknowledges! only! ‘We’!reasons.! It! seems! that! group! identification! involves!something!more!than!framing!in!the!sense!of!variable!frame!theory:! the!group.identifier!does!not!merely!become!aware!of! group! concepts,! she! also! becomes! committed! to! the!priority!of!group!concepts!over!individual!ones”!(p.199).!!!!In!one!of!his!unpublished!papers!(Bacharach,!1997),!Bacharach!allowed!for!the! possibility! of! the! existence! of! three! frames:! the! I! frame,! the!we! frame!
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and! the! ‘S’! (superordinate)! frame.! We! and! I! are! called! simple! frames:!“players!in!them!begin!their!reasoning!with!the!two!basic!conceptualization!of! the! situation,! as! ‘what! shall! we! do?’! problem! and! ‘what! shall! I! do?’!problem! respectively”! (p.5).! An! S! frame! is! active!when! someone!manages!“during! deliberation! to! see! the! problem! from! both! the! we! and! the! I/she!perspectives”(p.14).!Although!Bacharach!allows!for!the!existence!of!S,!based!on!psychological!attainments,!he!states!that!we!and!I!perspectives!cannot!be!held! simultaneously:! “Although!we! can! switch! self.identities! rather! easily,!we! appear! to! be! unable! to! inhabit! more! than! one! at! a! time”! (p.15).! He!assumes! that! I! thoughts! in! the! S! frame! generate! a! personal! evaluation,!whereas!we!thoughts!generate!a!group!evaluation.!The!solution!concept!in!the!model!roughly!states!that!the!cooperative!option!is!chosen!by!a!player!in!S!if!it!is!the!best!in!group!evaluation!and!not!worse!than!the!other!option!in!personal!evaluation.!!!!The!S.frame!intuition!of!the!1997!unpublished!paper,!however,!disappeared!in!subsequent!pieces!of!work.!!!Later!on,!in!developing!VFT!Bacharach!faces!the! issue! of! integrability! of! frames.! He! says! that! normally! frames! are!integrable:!!!!“It! is! easy! to! integrate! frames! which! consist! of! classifiers!such!as!shape,!colour!and!position:!we!can!easily!see!a!mark!as!a!triangle,!as!a!blue!triangle,!as!a!blue!triangle!on!the!left,…!on!the!other!hand…!a!person!can!see!the!marks!as!letters!and!as! geometric! shapes,! but! not! at! the! same! time! –! you! can’t!integrate!these!two!perceptions”!(2001!a,!p.6).!
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!Figure!3.1:!Rubin’s!vase.!!There!exist!frames,!then,!that!are!non.integrable.!‘I’!and!‘we’!frames!appear!non! integrable! in! Bacharach’s! words,! and! when! this! happens,! “the! agent!may!find!herself!vacillating!between!the!judgments!that!she!should!do![two!different! actions]”! (ib.).! The! idea! that! an! agent! can! 'vacillate'! between! the!two! frames!was! so! important! for!Bacharach! that! one! of! his! (not! realized)!desires! was! to! have! Rubin's! vase! (Figure! 3.1)! on! the! front! cover! of! the!book23 .!!!I!shall!suggest! later!that! it! is!possible!to!take!into!account!what!Bacharach!called! ‘personal’!and! ‘group’!evaluation,!by!reasoning!in!terms!of!deviation!from!an!equilibrium!and!not!in!terms!of!frames.!Or!better,!it!is!possible!to!do!that,!if!we!separate!the!two!aspects!of!framing:!how!a!frame!might!come!to!mind! and! how! a! person! endorses! a! particular! frame!when! she! sees!more!than!one!frame.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!23!This!comes!from!a!personal!communication!with!Robert!Sugden,!who!inferred!this!desire!by!managing!Bacharach's! incomplete!manuscript,!which!displayed!Rubin's!vase! image!on!the!first!page.!
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!
3.!The!determination!of!mode!of!reasoning!!!To!complete!the!theory,!Bacharach!needs!to!endogenize!the!determination!of!the!mode!of!reasoning!(this!means!the!endogenization!of!ω).!He!tries!to!endogenize!ω,!because!he!sees!the!fact!that!ω!is!exogenous!as!a!lacuna!in!his!theory24.!As!we!have!seen!in!section!2.2,!the!theory!of!the!determination!of!the!mode! of! reasoning! should! not! be! a! theory! of! rational! choice.! ! ! In! his!earlier!works! (Bacharach,! 1997,! 1999)! he! proposes! that! the! possibility! of!team! reasoning! is! related! to! having! ‘scope! for! cooperation’! and! to! the!‘harmony!of!interests’.!Harmony!is!a!non.strategic!assesment!of!the!game:!!!!“To! endogenize! ω,! ...,! one! must! show! that! the! payoffs! and!other!constitutive!features!of!the!basic!game!make!collective!identity! salient! or! otherwise! tend! to! induce! team.thinking.!The! laboratory! evidence! is! promising,! as! it! suggests! that!group! identification! may! be! induced! by! the! ‘common!problem’!mechanism’.!In!addition,! it! is!plausible!that!ω!may!be!an! increasing! function!of! certain!quantitative! features!of!the! payoff! structure,! such! as! ‘scope! for! co.operation’! and!‘harmony!of!interest’”!(1999,!p.144).!!!!A! step! forward! on! this! topic! has! been! made! by! Tan! and! Zizzo:25 in! their!work! there! is!an!attempt! to! investigate! the!relationship!between!harmony!of! interests! (‘game! harmony’! for! them),! group! identification! and!cooperation.!They!claim!that!game!harmony!is!a!good!predictor!of!the!extent!of! cooperation! or! conflict! in! games.! They! postulate! that! “game! harmony!increases! cooperation! by! increasing! the! probability! of! team! reasoning! on!the!part!of!different!players”!(Zizzo!2004,!p.20).!Game!harmony,!defined!as!“a! generic! property! describing! how! harmonious! or! disharmonious! the!interests!of!players!are,!as!embodied!in!the!payoffs”!(Tan!and!Zizzo!2008,!p.!3),!is!based!on!the!correlation!coefficient!between!payoff!pairs!.!the!Pearson!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!24!“The! unreliable! team! explanation! of! co.operative! behavior! I! outlined! in! this! paper!contains! an! important! lacuna.! The! distribution! of! agents! over! teams! and! the! probability!that!they!are!active,!are!exogenous”!(Bacharach!1999!p.!144).!25!See!Tan,!J.!and!D.!Zizzo!(2008),!Zizzo!D.!and!Tan,!J.!(2007),!and!Zizzo!D.!(2004).!
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or!Spearman!correlation!coefficient!between! the!payoffs!of! the!players! for!each! state! of! the! world! for! two! player! games26. This! measure! is! the! best!existent!proxy!for!what!Bacharach!has!called!‘the!harmony!of!interest’,!and!it!is!entirely!derived!from!the!payoffs!of!the!game.!It!is!a!potential!solution!of!Bacharach’s!problem!of!endogenization!of!ω.!However,!some!of!Bacharach's!intuitions! about! vacillation! cannot! be! expressed! by! the! game! harmony!approach.!!!Bacharach! also! tries! a! second! line! in! order! to! endogenize! ω.! This! is! the!(strong)! Interdependence! Hypothesis,! that! roughly! states:! perceived!interdependence! prompts! group! identification.! The! perception! of!interdependence!between!two!agents!in!a!game!is!given!by!three!factors:!!!
• common!interest!(the!agents!have!common!interest!in!some!s*!over!s,!if!both!prefer!s*!to!s,!where!s*,!s!are!possible!states!of!affairs,!or,!in!a!game,!possible!outcomes)!!!
• copower!(nobody!can!reach!s*!alone,!but!both!can!together)!!!
• standard!solution!(basically!the!existence!of!a!Nash!equilibrium!that!realises!s).!!!Basically,!in!Bacharach's!interdepence!hypothesis,!if!an!outcome!that!can!be!reached! by! an! individual! way! of! reasoning! (standard! solution)! is! Pareto.dominated!by!another!outcome!that!no!individual!can!be!sure!of!achieving!on! her! own,! but! that! can! be! achieved! if! all! members! of! the! group! act! in!concert,! there! is! space! for! group! identification.! ! The! interdependence!hypothesis!uses!I.reasoning!as!a!default,!makes!use!of!opportunities!for!we.deviations!that!are!good!for!'us'!and!treats!these!opportunities!as!prompting!we.reasoning.!Interdependence!fits!with!the!intuition!Bacharach!had!about!vacillation! between! frames,! but! it! seems! to! give! an! account! only! of! we.deviation! from! I.thoughts.! What! about! the! opposite,! that! is! from! we.thoughts!to!I.thoughts?!!Bacharach!offers!only!an!informal!conjecture!about!deviation! from! we! to! I:! the! 'double.crossing! intuition'.! Taking! the! most!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!26 !In! general,! in! n.player! games! this! measure! is! an! average! of! Pearson! (Spearman)!correlation!coefficients!among!payoff!pairs.!
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famous! game! in! terms! of! cooperation,! the! PD! game,! as! an! example,!Bacharach!says:!!!“In! a! Prisoner’s! Dilemma,! players! might! see! only,! or! most!powerfully,! the! feature! of! common! interest! and! reciprocal!dependence!which! lie! in! the! payoffs! on! the!main! diagonal”!(Bacharach!2006,!p.86).!!!!If!this!happens,!players!do!cooperate.!But,!it!might!be!the!case!that!!!!“they! might! see! the! problem! in! other! ways.! For! example,!someone!might!be!struck!by!the!thought!that!her!coplayer!is!in! a! position! to! double.cross! her! by! playing! D! in! the!expectation!that!she!will!play!C.!This!perceived!feature!might!inhibit!group!identification”!(ib).!!!Here!Bacharach! seems! to!have! in!mind! some!psychological!process!which!inhibits! group! identity! and! which! is! not! quite! represented! by! his! own!concept!of!interdependence!–!the!idea!of! ‘double.crossing’.!The!reason!this!idea!does!not!fit!his!framework!is!that!double.crossing!is!the!incentive!to!act!on! individual! reasoning! when! one! believes! the! other! is! acting! on! team!reasoning.!And,!what!is!more,!double.crossing!is!a!reason!for!a!person!who!we.reasons! to! switch! to! the! I.frame.! A! player,! in! order! to! recognize! the!‘double.crossing’!threat,!should!be!allowed!to!imagine!herself!in!a!we.frame,!and!then!deliberating!to!cooperate,!but!at!the!same!time!she!should!use!the!I.frame!by!thinking!that!the!other!player!would!take!advantage!of!her.!In!the!first! player’s! conjecture,! the! other! player! too! should! use! the!we.frame! in!order! to! think! that! the! first! player! could! choose! to! cooperate,! and,! at! the!same!time,!she!should!use!I.frame!in!order!to!think!how!to!‘double!cross’!the!first! player.! We! may! formalize! what! the! statement! 'i! double.crosses! j'!means,!i!and!j!being!the!two!players:!!!
• [Proposition%P]:! i! defects;! i! believes! that! j!will! cooperate;! i! believes!that!j!believes!that!i!will!cooperate.!!And!'j!believes!that!i!will!double.cross!j'!means:!!!
• j!believes!P.!!
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It! is! now! clearer! that! j's! thoughts! include:! i! acting! on! I.reasoning;! i!attributing!we.reasoning!to!j;!i!attributing!to!j:!attributing!we.reasoning!to!i.!!In!the!theory!of!we.thinking!the!way!in!which!a!person!reasons!(I.mode!or!we.mode)!is!a!consequence!of!the!perceived!frame.!She!may!switch!from!the!I.mode! of! reasoning! to!we.reasoning! (if! the!we.frame! comes! to!mind),! or!not.!Bacharach,!then,!does!not!seem!to!take!into!account!the!possibility!that!once!we!are!in!the!we.frame,!we!may!switch!to!the!I.mode!of!reasoning,!or!better,! he! allows! the! possibility! of! switching! frame,! but! does! not! allow! a!person!to!be!able! to!visualize!switching! frames.!And!this! is!why!he!cannot!represent! his! ‘double.crossing’! intuition.! It! seems! also,! that!when! the!we.frame! is! perceived,! it! is! also! perceived! as! the! correct! frame! or! dominant!frame,! so! that!once!a!person! sees! the!world! this!way! she! cannot!visualize!going!back!to!seeing! it! the!other!way!(compare! illusions,!myths,! lies!–! ‘the!scales!fell!from!my!eyes’).!!!!In!order! to!complete!Bacharach's! theory! in!a!more! formal!way,!we!need!a!model!of!vacillation,!with!deviation!both!from!I!to!we!and!from!we!to!I.!!!!I! shall! present! a! first! step! in! the! next! section,! where! I! propose! a!representation!of!the!double.crossing!intuition.!!!!
4.!Representing! the! ‘double7crossing'! intuition:! reasoning! in! terms!of!
deviations  from!equilibrium!In! what! follows,! I! shall! present! my! analysis! in! terms! of! individual! and!collective! rationality! as! two! alternative! ways! of! approaching! a! decision!problem,! and! in! particular! I! shall! focus! on! reasons! for! deviating! from! an!equilibrium.! For! simplicity! I! am! considering! two.player! games,! but! the!analysis!could!be!easily!extended!to!n.player!games.!!!First! of! all,! I! suppose! that! the! group! utility! function! of! a! combination! of!actions!is!given!by!the!mean!of!individual!payoffs,!as!proposed!by!Bacharach!(1999,!2006)27 .!A!player!who!team!reasons,!first!computes!which!is!the!best!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!27!This!formulation!is!the!most!used!one!in! literature.! I!use!it! for!concreteness,!but!any!W!which! satisfies! he! Paretianness! condition! could! be! used! without! affecting! the! main!conclusions!of!my!analysis.!
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!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!28!In!this!version!of!the!model,!I!am!not!taking!account!of!the!problems!of!'unreliability'!that!Bacharach!models!by!mean!of!circumspect!team!reasoning.!The!focus!here!is!on!vacillation,!and!at!this!stage!I!want!to!keep!the!model!as!simple!as!possible.!29!In! section! 5! I! will! take! in! account! also! situations! in! which! the! optimal! profile! for! the!group!is!not!unique.!
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D! 4,1! 2,2!!Game! D1! is! a! PD! game,! it! has! one! Nash! equilibrium! (D,! R)! and! one! we.equilibrium!(U,!L),!but!these!do!not!coincide.!!Table!3.5:!game!D2!
! L! R!
U! 4,1% 0,0!
D! 3,2% 1,3!!Game! D2,! instead,! has! two!We.equilibria! (U,! L)! and! (D,! L)! and! two! Nash!equilibria! (U,!L)!and! (D,!R),!but!only! (U,!L)! is! seen!as!an!equilibrium! from!both! I! and! we! points! of! view.! ! If! an! equilibrium! survives! both! I! and! we!deviation! tests,! it! is! particularly! strong,! in! the! sense! that! it! allows! for! the!existence!of!both!ways!of!reasoning.!At!the!same!time!such!an!equilibrium!could! be! seen! as! a! refinement! when! more! than! one! .! Nash! or! we! .!equilibrium!exists.!I!shall!call!this!equilibrium:!I.we!equilibrium.!In!game!B,!for!example,!there!are!two!we.equilibria,!but!if!we!allow!players!to!see!the!game!endorsing!both!I!and!we!concepts,! this!could!help!them!to!recognize!that! the! (U,! L)! equilibrium! is! the! prominent! one,! because! it! passes! both!deviation!tests.!In!this!case,!having!an!I!thought!helps!we.reasoners!to!select!an! equilibrium.!But! the! opposite! can! happen! as! in! the!Hi.Lo! game,!where!there! are! two! Nash! equilibria! and! we.thoughts! can! help! I.reasoners! to!choose!the!(U,!L)!equilibrium.!!!This!double!test! for!deviation!could!also!be!seen! in!terms!of!deliberations,!and!not!only!as!a!method!for!testing!the!existence!of!an!equilibrium.!It!can!
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represent! a! model! of! transition! between! modes! of! reasoning,! and! as! a!component!of!a!model!of!vacillation!between!them.!The!scheme!in!table!3.6!represents! a! possible! way! to! classify! the! previous! games! in! terms! of!deliberation,!or!vacillation.!Formally,! if! we! define! I! as! the! set! of! I.solutions! and!W! as! the! set! of! we.solutions,!and!we!assume!that! they!are!non.empty,! then!the!question!“Are!we!always!happy”!means:! is!I⊆!W?!And!the!question!“Am!I!always!happy”!means:!is!W⊆!I?!!!Take!for!example!game!A:!in!this!game,!if!I!start!to!reason!in!the!standard!I.mode,!we!as!a!group!will!be!happy!with! the! result! (U,!L),! i.e.!we!shall!not!want!to!deviate!jointly!from!the!I.reasoning!‘solution’.!Conversely,!if!I!group!identify,!and!then!I!look!for!the!best!solution!for!the!group,!I!as!an!individual!will!be!happy!with!the!result,!i.e.!I!will!not!want!to!deviate!unilaterally!from!the! we! solution.! So,! in! this! game,! the! same! result! will! be! reached,!independently!of!the!particular!way!of!reasoning.!We!may!say!that!I!or!we.reasoning! are! observationally! indifferent! or! equivalent,! because! they! give!the!same!result! in! terms!of! choice.!Every!game! in!which! I! and!W! coincide!(I⊆!W! and!W⊆!I)! belongs! to! this! “Yes.Yes”! category.! But! there! could! be!different!situations.!Let!us!look!at!game!B:!in!this!case,!if!I!start!with!the!I.mode,! there!will!be!a!unique!Nash!equilibrium!(U,!L),!which! is!also!one!of!the! two!possible! (and! indifferent)!we.solutions.! If! I! start!with! the! I.mode,!we!shall!then!be!happy!with!the!result.!If!we!group!identify!and!we.reason,!if!we.reasoning!gets!us!to!(U,!L),!I!am!happy.!But!if!it!gets!us!to!(D,!R),!I!am!unhappy.!I!may!then!turn!to!the!I.mode!of!reasoning.!In!a!vacillation!process!if,!when!reasoning!in!one!mode,!the!conclusion!is!not!endorsed!by!reasoning!in!the!other!mode,!there!is!some!tendency!to!switch!to!that!other!mode.!So,!in!this!case,!the!end!of!the!vacillation!process!is!the!outcome!(U,!L),!either!by!we.mode! or! by! I.mode! of! reasoning.! This! result! is! observationally!equivalent!to!I.reasoning!but!not!to!we.reasoning,!because!the!latter!allows!(D,!R).!In!this!case!the!set!I!is!a!proper!subset!of!W!(I⊂W).!!!!
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A! ! !! L! R!U! 3,3! 4,1!D! 1,4! 2,2!
!
B! ! !! L! R!U! 2,2! 3,0!D! 0,3! 2,2!
!
NO!
C! ! !! L! R!U! 3,3! 1,1!D! 1,1! 2,2!
!
D1! ! !! L! R!U! 3,3! 1,4!D! 4,1! 2,2!





by!the!we.solution).!But!if!we!group!identify!the!we.solution!is!not!good!for!me!(I!would!be!better!off!by!playing!the!other!strategy).! In! this!case!there!can!be!a! continuous! switching!or!vacillation! from!a! frame! to!another:! this!could! be! an! explanation! of! the! empirical! evidence! on! behaviour! in! PD!games.! In! fact,! in! experiments! on! the! PD! game,! we! observe! a! rate! of!cooperation! of! about! 50%! (see! Sally! 1995).! Following! Bacharach’s!interdependence!hypothesis,! the!PD,!as!we!have!seen,! is!one!of! the! typical!games! that! can! lead! to! we.reasoning,! although! Bacharach! himself! was!aware!of!the!double.crossing!threat.!In!the!framework!I!have!presented,!the!double.crossing!intuition!is!taken!into!account,!and!this!generates!perpetual!shifts!between!modes!of!reasoning,!and!then!we.reasoning!is!only!one!of!the!two! possible! solutions.! The! PD! game! represents! a! category! of! games! in!which!I⊈W!and!W⊈I.!In!this!particular!case!I!and!W!are!disjoint!(I∩W=∅).!!!Game! D2! belongs! to! the! same! category,! but! in! this! case! the! intersection!between!I!and!W! is!non!empty!(I∩W!≠ ∅):!if!I!start!with!the!I.mode!and!I.reasoning!gets!me!to!(U,!L)!we!are!happy;! if! I.reasoning! instead!gets!us!to!(D,!R)!we!are!not!happy.!The!same!happens!if!we!start!with!we.reasoning,!because! there! are! two!we.equilibria! and! only! one! of! them! is! also! a! Nash!equilibrium.!!!Provided! that! I! and!W! are! non! empty,! the! previous! examples! supply! a!complete!classification!of!games!in!terms!of!intersection!between!I!and!we.equilibria.!!!This!way!of! looking!at! a!decision!problem!does!not! tell! us!which! frame! is!more! likely! to! appear.! But,! if! a! frame! comes! to! mind,! within! this!classification,! we! may! see,! depending! on! the! kind! of! game! the! subject! is!facing,!if!the!frame!will!be!stable!or!not,!or,!in!other!words,!we!might!see!if!that! frame! is! an! absorbing! state! in! a! model! of! transition! or! vacillation!between!frames.!!!!In!order!to!say!something!more!about!games!with!conflicting!frames,!in!the!next! section! I! propose! a! formalization! of! the! intuitions! embedded! in! the!previous!classification!of!games.!!
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5.!A!more!formal!vacillation!model!!!The!classification!I!proposed!in!the!previous!section!represents!a!first!step!towards!a!generalization!of!Bacharach's!model!and!intuitions.!In!the!present!section!I!show!a!possible!way!to!generalize!the!previous!results:!I!sketch!a!simple!model!based!on!I!and!we!temptations!to!deviate!from!an!equilibrium,!and!on!a!possible! refinement!of! equilibria.! In!what! follows! I!do!not! try! to!model! explicitly! how! agents! might! reason! about! the! mode! of! reasoning!other! agents! are! likely! to! adopt.! I! prefer! at! this! stage! to! keep! the! model!simple!enough!in!order!to!provide!the!building!blocks!of!a!possible!complete!theory! of! we.reasoning.! The! model! I! shall! propose! can! be! thought! as! a!model!of!how!to!endogenize!ω!(the!probability!the!player!is!in!the!we.mode!of! reasoning).! Once! ω! is! determined,! one! can! apply! the! standard!'circumspect! team! reasoning'! procedure,! as! presented! by! Bacharach,! in!order! to! allow! for! unreliable! teams.! In! the! previous! section! I! considered!only! pure.strategy! equilibria! but! here! I! allow! mixed! strategies.! A! Nash!equilibrium!always!exists!in!pure!or!mixed!strategies!and,!as!long!as!utility!functions! are! continuous,! it! is! possible! to! allow!mixed.strategy! equilibria.!Being! a! maximum! of! a! finite! set,! a! we! equilibrium! always! exists! in! pure!strategies,! but! it! is! also! possible! to! consider! we.equilibria! in! mixed!strategies.!In!this!way!we!can!be!sure!that!I!and!W!sets!are!non.empty.!!!We! suppose! that! there! are! two! players:! 1,! 2
S1,! S2! are! the! strategy! sets! of! players! 1,! 2,! where! s1∈!S1! and! s2∈!S2! are! the!strategies!chosen!by!players.!Let!us!define!the!following!finite!utility!functions:!U1(s1,s2)=!1’s!individual!utility!U2(s1,s2)=!2’s!individual!utility!W(s1,s2)=!we.utility.!Individual! and! group! utilitiy! functions! have! the! characteristics! specified! in!section! 2.2.,! i.e.! the! individual! utility! is! represented! by! a! standard! von!Neumann!.!Morgenstern!utility!function,!and!group!utlity!is!represented!by!a!team!utility!function!which!satisfies!the!Paretianness!condition.!
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Considering!any!candidate!equilibrium! s1*, s2*( ) from!the!viewpoint!of!player!1,!we!define:!
• Own!temptation!to!deviate!!=!max
s1∈S1
U1 s1, s2*( )−U1 s1*, s2*( )#$ %&≡ T1 s1*, s2*( ) !
• Other’s!temptation!to!deviate!=max
s2∈S2
U2 s1*, s2( )−U2 s1*, s2*( )#$ %&≡ T2 s1*, s2*( ) !
• Our!temptation!to!deviate!=! max
s1∈S1,s2∈S2
W s, s2( )−W s1*, s2*( )#$ %&≡ TW s1*, s2*( ) .!Temptations!to!deviate!are!necessarily!greater!than!or!equal!to!031.!!Now! it! is! possible! to! define! a! Nash! Equilibrium! in! terms! of! temptation! to!deviate.!We!have!a!Nash!equilibrium!when!the!following!conditions!hold:!
T1 s1*, s2*( ) = 0






                                              1[ ] !
A!we.equilibrium!is!given!when:!
Tw s1*, s2*( ) = 0                                                   2[ ] !The! next! step! is! to! define! an! I.we! equilibrium:! An! I.we! equilibrium! is! the!intersection!between!I!and!W,!and!it!exists!when!both!conditions![1]!and![2]!hold.!!!!For!this!reason,!I.we!equilibrium!can!be!seen!as:!!!(i)!a!refinement!of!Nash!equilibirum!!!(ii)!a!refinement!of!we.equilibrium.!!!An!I.we!equilibrium!helps!to!refine!I.equilibria!from!a!we!point!of!view!and!we.equilibria!from!an!I!point!of!view,!as!we!have!seen!in!the!classification!in!figure!2.!Of!course!there!can!be!more!than!one!I.we!equilibrium,!just!as!there!can!be!more!than!one!Nash!equilibrium.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31!Take!for!example!the!game!D1!(PD!game):!if!we!consider!the!profile!(U,!L)!as!a!candidate!equilibrium,! we! have! that! s1 which! maximizes! U1 s1,L( )−U1 U.L( )"# $% !is! D;! and! then!
T1 U,L( ) = T2 U,L( ) = 4−3[ ] =1 .!If!we!consider!(D,R)!as!a!candidate!equilibrium!we!have!that! s1 !which! maximizes! U1 s1,R( )−U1 D.R( )"# $% !is! D! as! well;! and! then!
T1 D,R( ) = T2 D,R( ) = 0 .!
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But! there! could! be! cases,! as! in! the! PD! game,! in!which! an! I.we! equilibrium!does!not!exist,!because!the!conditions![1]!and![2]!can!not!both!be!met.!When!this! happens,! it! is! possible! to! generalize! the! analysis! by! developing!Bacharach's! intuition! about! vacillation.! First! of! all,! in! order! to! do! that,! we!need!two!candidate!equilibria!.!a!Nash!and!a!we.equilibrium.!So,!if!the!game!presents! more! than! one! Nash! or! we.equilibrium,! we! can! imagine! a!refinement!among!them.!For!example,!the!following!could!be!a!refinement!of!Nash!equilibrium:!! (a) choose! the! Nash! equilibrium! which! minimizes! h TW s1*, s2*( )( ) ,! where!
h ...( ) !is!an!increasing!and!finite!(for!finite!TW)!function,!with!h 0( ) = 0 .!Or,!in!case!of!more!than!one!we.equilibria,!a!refinement!could!be:!!(b) choose! the! we.equilibrium! which! minimizes! l T1 s1*, s2*( ),T2 s1*, s2*( )( ) !where! l ...( ) !is!an! increasing!and! finite! (for! finite!T1! and!T2)! function,!with! l 0,0( ) = 0 .!If! two! or!more! equilibria! are! eligible! in! (a)! and! (b),! we!might! postulate! a!random! choice! among! them.! This! will! not! affect! the! remaining! part! of! the!analysis,!as!we!shall!see!later32.!We!shall!treat!(a)!and!(b)!as!the!candidate!equilibria!and!we!call:!
• candidate!Nash!equilibrium!≡ s1*, s2*( ) !
• candidate!we.equilibrium!≡ s1**, s2**( ) .!Now,!we!specify!a!solution!in!terms!of!the!probability!that!the!agent!is!acting!in!I.mode,!i.e.!the!probability!that! s1*, s2*( ) is!viewed!as!the!solution!by!player!1!(or!2)33,! as!well! as! the!probability!of! its! complementary!event:! the!agent! is!acting! in!we.mode.!We! shall! call! these!probabilities!vacillation!equilibrium.!!The!probabilities!used!in!vacillation!equilibrium!could!be!expressed!in!terms!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!32!See!footnote!n.!34.!33!The!probability! is! the! same! for!both!players!because!we! are! considering! temptations! to!deviate!for!both.!
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of!Markov!transition!processes.!In!fact,!Markov!chains,!with!their!properties,!seem! to! represent! the! best! candidate! for! a!model! of! vacillation.! Let! us! see!how.!Suppose!that!the!state!space!is!Ω = I,W{ } ,where!I!is!I.reasoning!and!W!is!we.reasoning,! and! that! X0,X1,...( ) is! the! sequence! of! possible! states! of! the!process.! If! we! call! p! the! probability! of! ! transition! from!we! to! I,! and! q! the!probability!of!transition!from!I!to!we,!we!may!define!the!transition!matrix:!
P =
P I, I( ) P I,W( )



















Let!π t !be! the! probability! distribution! at! t:!π t = π I ,tπW ,t!"#$# %&#'# !is! a! vector! whose!components!are!the!probability!of!I.reasoning!at!t,!and!the!probability!of!we.reasoning!at!t!for!player!i,!where!i=1,2.!It!is!known!that:!
π t+1 = π tP                                                          3[ ] !So!that,!for!example,!π It+1 = π It 1− q( )+πWt p = π It (1− q)+ 1−π It( ) p .!From! equation! [3],! the! probability! distribution! after! n! periods! is! given! by!
π n = Pnπ 0 .!The!eigenvalues!of!the!matrix!P!are!1!and!1.(p+q),!thus!the!matrix!eigenvectors!is!given!by:!






















Pn = XDnX−1 = 1p+ q
p+ q 1+ p+ q( ){ }n p− p 1+ p+ q( ){ }n




























































Suppose!that!p,!the!probability!(for!each!player)!of!transition!form!we!to!I!is!an!increasing!function!of!T1 s1**, s2**( ) !and!T2 s1**, s2**( ) !and!that!q,!the!probability!of!transition!from!I!to!we!is!an!increasing!function!of!TW s1*, s2*( ) :!
p = g T1 s1**, s2**( ),T2 s1**, s2**( )( ) !
q = f TW s1*, s2*( )( ) 34.!Then!
π I = pr player i is in I-mode[ ] =
g T1 s1**, s2**( ),T2 s1**, s2**( )( )
f TW s1*, s2*( )( )+ g T1 s1**, s2**( ),T2 s1**, s2**( )( )
!
and!!
!! = !" player'i'is'in'we'mode = ! !! !!∗, !!∗! !! !!∗, !!∗ + ! !! !!∗∗, !!∗∗ ,!! !!∗∗, !!∗∗ !!The!probabilities!π I and!πW ,!where!πW =1−π I ,!are!entirely!derived!from!the!temptations! to!deviate! from!equilibria,!and!represent!a!solution!when!an! I.!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!34!At! this! point! it! is! clear! that! if! we! have! more! than! one! Nash! or! we.equilibrium! which!minimize! respectively! f TW s1*, s2*( )( ) or! g T1 s1**, s2**( ),T2 s1**, s2**( )( ) ,! a! random! choice!among! them! does! not! affect! the! resulting! vacillation! equilibrium.! Because! of! the!minimization!criterion!used!in!(a)!and!(b),!the!chosen!Nash!equilibrium!must!be!equivalent!in! terms!of! f TW s1*, s2*( )( ) ,! and! the!chosen!we.equilibrium!must!be!equivalent! in! terms!of!
g T1 s1**, s2**( ),T2 s1**, s2**( )( ) .! Due! to! the! fact! that! the! probabilities!p! and!q! are! functions! of!
g T1 s1**, s2**( ),T2 s1**, s2**( )( ) !and!and! f TW s1*, s2*( )( ) ,! the!values!of!p!and!q!are!the!same,!no!matter!which!Nash!or!we.equilibrium!we!select.!
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we!equilibrium!does!not!exist.!The!model!is!then!complete.!In!fact,!πW !can!be!thought!as!ω!in!Bacharach's!terms:!the!probability!that!a!subject!will!group!identify.! In! this! way! we! have! obtained! a! way! to! endogenize! ω,! remaining!faithful!to!Bacharach!intuitions.!Starting!from!this!point!it!is!possible!to!apply!Bacharach's! analysis! as! illustrated! of! circumspect! team! reasoning.! ! As! I!already!said!in!the!introduction,!Bacharach!offered!two!different!proposals!to!complete!his! theory!with! the!endogenization!of! I/we!determination.!One! is!game!harmony,!the!other!is!the!interdependence!hypothesis.!My!approach!is!a!way!to!formalize!the!latter.!!To!see!how!these!probabilities!work!in!practice,!take!for!example!the!following!game:!!Table!3.7:!example!!
! a! b! c!
a! 10,10! 0,0! 0,15!
b! 0,0! 9,9! 0,10!
c! 15,0! 10,0! 1,1!!In!this!game!(a,a)!is!the!unique!we.equilibrium,!and!(c,c)!is!the!unique!Nash!equilibrium.!They!do!not!coincide.!!As!an!illustration,!suppose!that:!
f TW s1*, s2*( )( ) = TW s1*, s2*( ) !
g T1 s1**, s2**( ),T2 s1**, s2**( )( ) = T1 s1**, s2**( )+T2 s1**, s2**( ) !and!that!the!group!utility!function!W!has!the!same!form!as!the!function!used!in!section!435.!!The!vacillation!model!then!gives:!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!35!The!group!utility!function!of!a!combination!of!actions!is!given!here!by!the!mean!of!individual!payoffs.!A!suitable!property!for!W,!but!also!for!f%and!for!g!is!to!be!invariant!to!positive!affine!transformations!of!the!utlitities.!Following!Bacharach!this!could!be!made!possible!by!embedding!in!W!the!principles!of!Nash’s!axiomatic!bargaining!theory!(trying!to!find!the!equivalent!of!the!disagreement!reference!point).!Another!possibility!is!to!use!utilities!which!are!ratio!scale!measurable,!but,!as!it!has!been!demonstrated!by!Tsui!(1997),!they!allow!weak!Pareto!dominance!principle!only.!
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π I = pr 1 plays c[ ] =
5+ 5









πW = pr 1 plays a[ ] =
9














D! 1,3! 2,2!!!!The!game!in!table!3.8!belongs!to!category!A,!but!now!the!game!harmony!has!become!positive:! it! is!0.2.!One!of! the!reasons! for! this!differences! is! that!my!approach,! unlike! that! of! game! harmony,! is! based! on! strategic! reasoning.!!These!are!only!examples,!but!they!show!that!there!is!space!for!a!comparison!in! terms! of! behavioral! predictions! between! my! proposal! and! the! game!harmony! measure,! as! well! as! other! behavioral! predictions,! deriving! from!theories!of!social!preferences,!which!do!not!deal!with!we.reasoning.!!
6.!Conclusions!!!In! this! paper! I! have! analysed! and! extended! Bacharach’s! theory! of! we.thinking.! This! is! a! very! well! developed! formal! theory! of! games! with! I.reasoning! and!we.reasoning,!with! the!mode!of! reasoning! taken! as! given.!A!fundamental! feature!of! the! theory! is! that! the!mode!of! reasoning! is!prior! to!rational!choice.!So,!as!Bacharach!himself!recognises,! to!complete!the!theory!there!has! to!be!a!model!of!which!mode!of! reasoning! is!used!by! the!agents.!This!part!is!less!formal!and!less!developed!by!Bacharach,!although!he!offers!many! intuitions! and! suggestions.! In! particular! I! have! described! two!approaches!Bacharach!attempted! to!use:! the!harmony!approach,!developed!by! Zizzo! and! Tan,! and! the! interdependence! idea,! which! contains! an!underdeveloped!intuition!about!vacillation!between!frames,!and!is!only!one!way!.!I!to!we.!in!its!formal!presentation,!but!it!seems!naturally!two!way!.!I!to!we!and!we!to!I!.!as!we!see!in!the!double.crossing!intuition.!!!!I!have!proposed!a!way!in!which!the!double.crossing!intuition!may!be!taken!into!account:!reasoning!about!deviation!from!equilibrium,!where!equilibrium!is! seen! both! from! an! I! and! from! a! we! point! of! view.! I! have! presented! a!classification!of!games,!based!on!reasons!to!deviate!from!an!equilibrium!(I!or!
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1. Introduction!That!people!can!coordinate!their!actions!in!one2shot!games!with!several!Nash!equilibria! is! no! more! a! mystery! in! game! theory.! What! is! still! under!investigation! is! how! they! coordinate.! ! Experimental! evidence! from! pure!coordination,!Hi2Lo! and!battle! of! the! sexes! games! shows! that!players! often!coordinate! successfully,! although! the! coordination! rate! depends! on! some!features!of!the!games!!(see!Camerer!2003!for!a!review).!Several!explanations!of!coordination!in!equilibrium!selection!have!been!put!forward! in! the! recent! literature.! Among! these,! two! main! approaches! are!emerging:!team!reasoning!and!cognitive!hierarchy!theories.!According!to!team!reasoning,!players!look!for!the!equilibrium!that!is!best!for!the!players!as!a!‘team’36.!!In! very! general! terms,! in! cognitive! hierarchy! models! players! aim! at!maximizing! their! payoff! and! their! reasoning! is! grounded! on! beliefs! about!what!opponents!of!lower!cognitive!level!would!do.!Players!are!assumed!to!be!heterogeneous! in! terms! of! cognitive! levels.! Thus! naïve! level! 0! players!will!choose! at! random.! Level! 1! players! will! best! respond! to! expected! level! 0’s!choice,!level!2!player!will!best!respond!to!expected!level!1’s!choice!and!so!on.!The! experimental! evidence! on! the! emergence! of! focal! points! in! simple!coordination!games!(see!Metha!et!al.!1994,!Bardsley!et!al.!2010,!Crawford!et!al.!2008!and!Isoni!et!al.!2012)!reports!mixed!results!about!the!relative!merits!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!36!Colman! et! al.! (2008)! explains! how! team! reasoning! provides! a! justification! for! choosing!payoff2dominant!equilibria,!a!concept!introduced!by!Harsanyi!and!Selten!(1998).!
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of! these! two! explanations:! some! results! can!be! explained!by! both! theories,!some!only!by! team!reasoning,!and!some!others!only!by!cognitive!hierarchy!models.!!!!Despite!the! inconclusive!findings,! it! is!possible!to! infer!some!clues!from!the!literature.! It!appears! that! there!are!some!characteristics!of! the!equilibria! in!these!games,!independent!of!the!two!theories,!which!attract!players,!so!that!team! reasoning! or! cognitive! hierarchy! predictions! work! better! when! they!pick! out! attractive! equilibria.! ! Such! characteristics! may! include! Pareto!dominance!and!equality!of!payoffs.!!However,!a!formal!test!of!this!conjecture!has!not!been!provided!yet.!!This! paper! is! an! attempt! to! contribute! to! the! solution! of! the! puzzle.! We!observe! subjects! playing! a! series! of! coordination! games,! with! different!configurations!of!equality!and!Pareto2dominance,! for!which! it! is!possible! to!provide!clear!predictions!derived!from!both!team!reasoning!and!a!particular!cognitive! hierarchy! model:! level2k! ! theory.! ! In! line! with! previous!experimental! results,! we! find! that! each! theory! fails! to! predict! observed!behaviour!in!some!games.!However,!because!of!the!design!of!our!experiment,!we!can!go!deeper!into!the!matter.!In!particular,!we!observe!that!team!reasoning!theory!fails!to!predict!choices! when! it! picks! out! a! solution! which! is! Pareto! dominated! and! not!compensated! by! greater! equality;! level2k! theory! fails! in! games! in! which! it!predicts!a!choice!which!is!less!equal!than!the!alternative!choices.!!Two!alternative!explanations!can!account!for!this!evidence.!One!is!related!to!Bacharach’s!(2006)!theory!of!team!reasoning:!according!to!this!explanation,!team!reasoning!and!individual!reasoning!are!two!modes!of!reasoning!which!can!be!activated!by!different!characteristics!of!the!games.!!The! other! explanation! is! based! on! the! assumption! that! ! players! are! team!reasoners,!but!not!every!one!is!so!sophisticated!in!his!reasoning!to!follow!all!the!steps!team!reasoning!requires!to!reach!a!solution.!We! call! these! players,! who! are! mostly! guided! by! Pareto! dominance!considerations,!‘naïve’!team!reasoners.!We!show!that!allowing!!the!presence!of!naïve!team!reasoners!organizes!our!results!very!well.!
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Team!reasoning!and!cognitive!hierarchies!theories,!and!experimental!studies!aimed!at!testing!them!will!be!analysed!in!section!2.! In!section!3!we!present!the! experimental! design! and! procedures,! in! section! 4! we! discuss! the!theoretical!predictions,! in! section!5!we!present!and!discuss! the! results! and!section!6!shows!our!conclusions.!!!
2.Team! reasoning! and! Level7k:! experimental! evidence! and! theoretical!
issues!
2.1.'Team'reasoning'and'level4k'theories!Team!reasoning!and!cognitive!hierarchy!theories,!as!explanations!of!selection!of!equilibrium!in!coordination!games,!appeared!as!alternative!explanation!of!focal!points37.!!Mehta!et!al.!(1994)!distinguish!between!two!main!explanatory!strategies.! ! In! one! approach,! which!Mehta! et! al.! attribute! to! Lewis! (1969),!players’! choices! are! grounded! on! primary' salience! (i.e.! psychological!propensities! to!pick!particular! strategies!by!default)! and! secondary'salience!(i.e.!players’!beliefs!about!other!players’!perceptions!of!primary!salience).!!In!the!other!approach,!attributed!!to!Schelling!(1960),!players!look!for!a!“rule!of!selection!(and!by!extension,!the!label!or!strategy!that!it!identifies)…!![which]!suggests! itself! or! seems! obvious! or! natural! to! people! who! are! looking! for!ways! of! solving! coordination! problems”! (p.! 661).! ! A! rule! of! this! kind! has!
Schelling' salience.! The! first! approach! focuses! on! individual! strategic!reasoning,!assuming!that!players,!who!differ!in!their!cognitive!abilities,!aim!at!maximizing! their! payoffs! by! best! replying! to! the! strategy! that! they! expect!their! opponents! to! play.! ! The! second! approach! assumes! that! the! shared!objective!of! the!players! is! to!reach!coordination,!and! in!order! to!do!so! they!try!to!find!!an!effective!common!rule!of!conduct.!!Metha!et!al.!report!an!experimental!investigation!of!pure!coordination!games.!!Most!of!the!findings!of!this!experiment!are!compatible!with!both!secondary!salience! and! Schelling! salience.! They! conclude:! “Our! results! suggest! ! that!!Schelling!salience!!may!be!!playing!a!!significant!role.!!A!major!priority!must!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!37!Focal!points!have!been!introduced!by!Schelling!(1960):!they!are!particular!Nash!Equilibria!on!which!players’!expectations!converge.!
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now!!be!!to!!construct!!a!!more!!formal!!theory!!of!!Schelling!!salience!!which!will! !generate!!specific!!hypotheses!!that!can!!be!!tested!!experimentally”!(p.!682).!As! applied! to! coordination! games,! team! reasoning! can! be! thought! of! as! an!attempt! to! provide! this! formal! theory! of! ! Schelling! salience,! whereas!cognitive! hierarchy! theory! is! a! development! of! primary! and! secondary!salience.!!However,!both!theories!are!more!general!than!this.!!Different! general! formulations! of! team! reasoning! (or! ‘we2reasoning’)! have!been! proposed! by! David! Hodgson! (1967),! Donald! Regan! (1980),! Margaret!Gilbert! (1989),! Susan! Hurley! (1989),! Raimo! Tuomela! (1995,! 2007),! and!Martin! Hollis! (1998).!Within! this! body! of! literature,! Robert! Sugden! (1993,!2000,! 2003)! and! Michael! Bacharach! (1995,! 1997,! 1999,! 2006)! have!developed!game2theoretic!analyses.!The! key! idea! is! summarised! by! Bacharach! as:! “Roughly,! somebody! ‘team2reasons’!if!she!works!out!the!best!feasible!combination!of!actions!for!all!the!members!of!her!team,!then!does!her!part!in!it”!(Bacharach!2006,!p.!121).!In! other! words,! when! people! team2reason! they! seek! an! answer! to! the!question:!“What!should!we!do?”,!and!they!act!accordingly.!A! shared! view! among! scholars! who! study! team! reasoning! is! that! in! some!circumstances! people! team! reason,! in! some! others! not.! Circumspect! Team!reasoning! (Bacharach! 2006),! common! reason! to! believe! (Sugden! 2003),!game! harmony! (Tan! and! Zizzo! 2008)! and! vacillation! (Smerilli! 2012)! are!models!which!try!to!explain!this! fact.!However,!why!and!when!people!team!reason!and!why!and!when!they!do!not!remains!still!unclear.!Level2k! and! cognitive! hierarchy! theories! (Stahl! and! Wilson! (1994,! 1995);!Nagel!(1995);!Ho,!Camerer!and!Weigelt!(1998);!Bacharach!and!Stahl!(2000);!Costa2Gomes,!Crawford!and!Broseta!(2001);!Camerer,!Ho!and!Chong;!Costa2Gomes! and! Crawford! (2006))! can! be! thought! as! formalized! models! of!strategic!reasoning!based!on!primary!and!secondary!salience.!!
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In! this! work! we! concentrate! on! Level2k! ! theory38.! In! these! models,! each!player!belongs! to!a!category! (type)!and! follows!a!rule.! In!general!a! type!L1!will!anchor!his/her!beliefs!in!a!nonstrategic!L0!type,!and!best!respond!to!this.!A!L2!player!best! responds! to!L1,! and! so!on.!Then!k,! k=1,2,3,...! captures! the!level! of! reasoning.! ! Thus! the! behaviour! of! players! at! all! levels! above! L0! is!grounded! in! beliefs! about! L0! behaviour.! The! behaviour! of! the! nonstrategic!type!L0!is!different!in!different!versions!of!the!theory.!!In!some!versions,!!L0!chooses! at! random,! which! implies! that! L1! takes! account! only! of! his! own!payoffs;! in!other!versions,!L0! follows! ‘payoff!salience’,!which!means!that!he!takes! account! only! of! his! own! payoffs;! in! still! other! versions,! L0! favours!primarily!salient’!labels.!!!
2.2.'Experimental'evidence'Experimental! evidence! on! coordination! games! shows! mixed! results:!sometimes! it! seems! that! subjects! act! according! to! team!reasoning! theories,!sometimes!according!to!level2k.!!Crawford! et! al.! (2008)! report! experiments! using! pure! coordination! games!with!labels,!battle!of!the!sexes!(with!and!without!labels)!and!“pie”!games.!!In!a!pie!game,!subjects!try!to!coordinate!by!choosing!the!same!‘slice’!of!a!three2slice!pie.!!Different!slices!have!different!payoff!combinations,!and!one!slice!is!coloured! differently! from! the! other! two.! ! Crawford! et! al.! propose! a! level2k!model!that!explains!the!evidence!from!many!of!these!games,!but!note!that!the!choices!made!in!some!pie!games!can!be!explained!only!by!team!reasoning.!!Bardsley!et.!al!(2010)!report!experimental!evidence!about!behaviour!in!pure!coordination! games! and! Hi2Lo! games.! These! experiments! are! run,! with!apparently! minor! variations,! in! two! different! places:! the! results! from!Amsterdam! seem! to! support! team! reasoning,! whereas! the! results! from!Nottingham!can!be!explained!by!level2k!theory.!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!38!Cognitive! Hierarchy! Models! and! level2k! theory,! applied! to! our! games,! give! the! same!qualitative!predictions.!
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Isoni! et! al.! (2012)! ! investigate! games! with! the! same! payoff! structures! as!those!of!Crawford!et!al’s.!pure!coordination!and!battle!of!the!sexes!games,!but!with!different!displays.!!They!too!find!mixed!(but!less!extreme)!results.!By!going!deeper!into!this!literature,!at!least!three!clues!can!be!inferred.!!The! first! clue! is! that! team' reasoning' predictions'may' be' less' likely' to' work'
when' two' or' more' ' equilibria' are' not' Pareto' ranked' and' team' reasoning'
predicts'the'choice'of'one'of'these.!!In!such!games,!team!reasoning!has!to!deal!with!a!conflict!of!interest!between!players.!!Crawford!et!al.!(2008)!compare!pure!coordination!games!!with!battle!of!the!sexes! games,! when! both! are! presented! with! the! same! labelling.! They! find!high!rates!of!coordination!in!pure!coordination!games,!but!coordination!fails!in!battle!of!sexes.!A!similar!but!less!strong!result!is!obtained!by!Isoni!et!al.(2012),!who!find!that!although! focal!points!work! in!battle!of! sexes,! they!are! less!effective! than! in!pure! coordination! games.! This! suggests! that! there! is! more! individualistic!reasoning!when!there!is!a!conflict!of!interests.!!A! second! clue! is! that! equality'can' favour' team'reasoning.! If! team! reasoning!recommends!a!solution!with!equal!payoffs,!this!solution!is!liable!to!be!chosen!even!if!level2k!recommends!another!solution.!Crawford!et!al.!(2008:!1456)!report!two!pie!games!in!which!the!slice!that!is!distinguished!by!colour!has! the!payoffs! (5,!5).! In! ‘game!AM1’! the!other! two!slices!have!payoffs!(5,!6)!and!(6,!5);! in! ‘game!AL1’,!these!payoffs!are!(5,!10)!and!(10,!5).!!Contrary!to!level!k!theory,!but!consistently!with!team!reasoning,!most!subjects!choose!the!(5,!5)!slices!in!these!games.!!!A!third!clue!is!that!when!there!is!a!conflict'between''ex4post'Pareto4dominance'
and'ex4ante'Pareto4dominance,'team'reasoning'predictions'of!ex2ante!Pareto2dominant!solutions'can'fail'to'work.!Consider!for!example!one!of!the! ‘number!task’!games!proposed!by!Bardsley!et! al.! (2010)! in!which! two! subjects!must! ! coordinate!by! choosing! the! same!option!among:!
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!(10,10)!(10,10)!(10,10)!(9,9)39.!!Team!reasoning!recommends!(9,9),!because!is!‘unique’.!If!the!players!cannot!distinguish!between!the!(10,10)!options,!there!is!no!rule!which!can!guarantee!that! their! payoffs! will! be! (10,10).! ! So,! from! an! ex! ante! perspective,! and!provided! that! the! players! are! not! extremely! risk2loving,! the! rule! “choose!(9,9)”! Pareto! dominates! the! rule! “pick! a! (10,10)”.! ! ! Then,! if! subjects! ask!themselves!‘what!should!we!do?’,!it!is!evident!that!(9,9)!is!the!best!choice!for!“us”.!!Ex2post,!however,!once!the!choice!is!made!and!the!other’s!choice!is!known,!(9,9)!is!Pareto!dominated!by!(10,10).!When!this!task!was!used!in!Bardsley!et!al.’s!Amsterdam!experiment,!most!subjects!coordinated!on!(9,9),!in!a!similar!Nottingham! experiment,! most! subjects! distributed! their! choices! over! the!(10,10)!options,!as!predicted!by!level!k!theory.!These!clues!have!been!noticed!already.!!!Crawford!et!al.!(2008)!allude!to!the!first!two!clues!when!they!conclude!their!paper! with! a! conjecture:! “We! speculate! that! the! use! of! team! reasoning!depends! on!Pareto2dominance! relations! among! coordination! outcomes! and!their! degree! of! payoff! conflict”(p.! 1456).! ! With! regard! to! the! third! clue,!Bardsley! et! al.! speculate! that! there! was! some! tendency! for! the! modes! of!reasoning!used!in!previous!pure!coordination!games!(different!in!Amsterdam!and!Nottingham)!to!spill!over!to!the!number!tasks.!!Because!the!focal!points!in! the! Amsterdam! pure! coordination! games! were! ‘odd! ones! out’,! this!may!have! primed! players! to! think! of! the! unattractive! uniqueness! of! the! (9,! 9)!option! as! a! means! of! coordination.! ! The! suggestion! seems! to! be! that! the!possibility!of!using!ex!ante!Pareto!dominance!as!a!coordination!device!is!not!immediately!obvious!to!many!subjects.!Although!we! can! infer! these! conjectures! from! the! literature,! the! results! on!which! they! are! based! are! not! systematic:! for! this! reason! we! carry! out! a!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!39!The!payoffs!are!not!displayed!in!a!line,!but!they!have!a!neutral!display.!
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controlled!test!in!which!every!game!has!a!unique!team!reasoning!choice!and!the! relationship! between! Pareto! dominance! and! equality! varies! between!games.!We!use!unlabelled!games,!in!order!to!produce!a!more!controlled!test,!by!reducing!the!number!of!potential!explanatory!variables.! ! !!
3.The!experiment:!design,!theoretical!predictions!and!procedures!As!has!been!seen!in!the!previous!section,!it!is!not!always!clear!how!and!when!team! reasoning! and! level2k! theories! work! as! explanations! of! coordinating!behaviour.! ! The! experiment! is! aimed! at! discriminating! between! the! two!theories!as!explanation!of!coordination!in!simple!games.!!Moreover,!it!allows!to!investigate!the!three!clues!discussed!in!the!previous!section.!!For! this! reason,! the! experiment! focuses! on! two! relevant! characteristics! of!equilibria:! equality! and! Pareto! dominance.! ! By! using! games! with! different!configurations!of!Pareto!dominance!and!equality,!we!are!able!to! investigate!the! relative! power! of! these! characteristics! to! attract! players! to! particular!equilibria.!!
3.1'The'pie'games''The! experiment! uses! two2person! pie! games! similar! to! those! used! by!Crawford! et! al! (2008),! except! that! the! slices,! which! in! our! experiment! are!represented! as! three! circles,! ! have! the! same! colour.! ! Payoffs! are! chosen! so!that! the! predictions! of! both! team! reasoning! and! level2k! theory! are!unambiguous,!with!a!unique!team!reasoning!optimal!choice!in!each!game.!Formally,! each! game! is! a! 3x3! coordination! game! with! the! payoff! matrix!shown!in!Table!4.1.!!The!parameters!x,!y,!v,!w!are!always!strictly!positive!and!satisfy!y≥x!and!{v,!w}!≠! {x,!y}.! !The! last! condition!ensures! that! the!strategy!pair!(R3,!R3)!is!unique!in!the!sense!that!it!can!be!distinguished!from!all!other!pairs! by! reference! only! to! payoffs.! ! In! contrast,! (R1,! R1)! and! (R2,! R2)! are!symmetrical!and!so!non2unique.!!!
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! R1! R2! R3!
R1! x,y! 0,0! 0,0!
R2! 0,0! y,x! 0,0!















































mind! to! normal! players.! ! Thus,! players! cannot! solve! the! problem! of!coordinating! on! one! of! the! slices! R1! and! R2! rather! than! the! other.! ! By!comparing! behaviour! in! the! three! treatments,! which! differ! only! in! the!positioning!of!the!slices,!we!will!be!able!to!test!this!assumption.!!The! experiment! investigated! eleven! games,! G1! to! G11.! ! The! payoffs! that!define!these!games!are!shown!in!Table!4.2.!!!!Table!4.2.!Outcomes!properties.!Game! Payoff! R1/R2! R3!
! R1! R2! R3! ! !G1! 9,10! 10,9! 9,9! P! E!G2! 9,10! 10,9! 11,11! 2! E,P!G3! 9,10! 10,9! 9,8! P! 2!G4! 9,10! 10,9! 11,10! 2! P!G5! 10,10! 10,10! 9,9! E,P! E!G6! 10,10! 10,10! 11,11! E! E,P!G7! 10,10! 10,10! 9,8! E,P! 2!G8! 10,10! 10,10! 11,10! E! P!G9! 9,12! 12,9! 10,11! 2! 2!G10! 10,10! 10,10! 11,9! E! 2!G11! 9,11! 11,9! 10,10! 2! E!
! ! ! ! ! !!These!games!have!different!configurations!of!Pareto!dominance!and!equality.!!Games!in!which!R1!and!R2!give!equal!payoffs!(i.e.!x=y)!are!shown!by!‘E’!in!the!‘R1/R2’!column.!!Games!in!which!R1!and!R2!weakly!Pareto!dominate!R3!(i.e.!x,y!≥!v!and!x,y!≥!w!with!at!least!one!strict!inequality)!are!shown!by!‘P’!in!this!column.!!Games!in!which!R3!gives!equal!payoffs!(i.e.!v=w)!are!shown!by!‘E’!in!
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the!‘R3’!column.!!Games!in!which!R3!weakly!Pareto!dominates!R1!and!R2!(i.e.!v!≥!x,y!and!!w!≥!x,y!with!at!least!one!strict!inequality)!are!shown!by!‘P’!in!this!column.! !By!using!11!pie!games!we!include!all! the!possible!combinations!of!entries!(i.e.!‘E’,!‘P’,!‘E,P’!and!‘2‘)!in!the!two!columns40.!!
3.2 Theoretical'predictions!The!experiment!is!designed!to!test!if!and!when!players!act!according!to!team!reasoning! or! level2k! theories.! In! this! section! we! analyse! the! theoretical!predictions! for! each! game,! using! the! assumption! that! slice! positions! are!nondescript.!!!
3.2.1'Team'reasoning'predictions!In!our!pie!games!R3!differs! from!R1!and!R2,!because!R1!and!R2!are!always!symmetrical.!What! is! the! team!optimal! choice! in! this! case?!We! shall! prove!that! R3! is! the! team! optimal! choice! in! each! game,! but! firstly! we! give! an!informal!intuition!for!this!result.!Because!R3!is!unique,!(v,w)!is!a!payoff!combination!that!the!players,!acting!as!a! team,! are! able! to! obtain! with! certainty.! ! But! if! the! players! have! no!commonly2understood!means!of!coordinating!on!one!of!R1!and!R2,!the!only!rule!they!can!use!is!‘pick!one!of!R1!and!R2’,!which!represents!a!lottery!for!the!team.!!Given!the!payoffs!in!our!games,!any!team!that!was!not!extremely!risk2loving! would! choose! R3! rather! than! this! lottery,! even! if! R3! was! Pareto2dominated!by!each!of!R1!and!R2!separately.!To! formalise! this! intuitive! argument,! we! begin! by! defining! a! group! utility!function! U,! following! Bacharach! (2006,! pp.! 87288).! ! In! general,! one! of! the!problems! in! defining! such! a! function! is! to! deal! with! inequality! and! risk!aversion,! but! the! parameters! used! in! our! games! make! the! implications! of!team!reasoning!insensitive!to!these!characteristics.!!!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!40!Note!that!because!of!the!condition!{v,!w}!≠!{x,!y},!needed!to!ensure!R3!is!unique,!we!cannot!have! ‘E’! (as! distinct! from! ‘E,! P’)! in! both! columns.! !Nor,! because! of! the!definition! of! Pareto!dominance,!can!we!have!‘P’!or!‘E,P’!in!both!columns.!
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Following! the! literature! on! team! reasoning,! we! make! the! following! three!assumptions!about!U.!First,! we! assume! that! U! is! symmetrical,! that! is,! for! all! payoffs! s,! t,! U(s,t)! =!U(t,s).! ! According! to! Bacharach! (2006),! “It! is! reasonable! to! suppose! that!principles! of! symmetry! between! individual! payoffs!will! be! respected! in! U"!(p.145).! This! property!means! that,!when! engaging! in! team! reasoning,! each!player!treats!his!own!payoffs!in!exactly!the!same!way!as!his!co2player’s.!!Secondly,! we! assume! increasingness,! that! is,! U(s,t)! is! increasing! in! s! and! t.!!This! assumption! is! used! by! Bacharach,! who! calls! it! the! ‘Paretianness!Condition’.!Finally,! we! assume! that! the! group! utility! function! has! the! property! of! risk!aversion! (that! is,! is! concave! in! its!arguments).! !Risk!aversion!requires! that:!U(s,t)>U(2s,2t)/2.!This!seems!a!natural!assumption,!although!Bacharach!did!not!mention! it! in!his!work.!!It!is!used!by!Bardsley!et!al!(2010)41.!We!now!show!that!these!assumptions!imply!that,!if!the!players!are!unable!to!coordinate!on!one!of!R1!and!R2,!then!R3!is!the!team!optimal!option.!If! we! normalise! U(0,0)! =! 0,! then! (using! symmetry),! R3! is! team! optimal! if!U(v,w)>U(x,y)/2.! ! Without! loss! of! generality,! let! v≥w! and! x≤y.! ! Then! a!sufficient! condition! for!R3! to!be! team!optimal! is!U(w,w)>U(y,y)/2.! !By! risk!aversion,!we!have!that!U(y/2,y/2)>U(y,y)/2.!!So!a!sufficient!condition!for!R3!to!be!team!optimal!is!U(w,w)>!U(y/2,y/2).!!By!increasingness!and!symmetry,!this! is! equivalent! to!w>y/2!or!w/y!>1/2.! ! In!our!games! (see!Table!4.1)! the!lowest!value!of!w/y!is!8/10.!!Thus!R3!is!(very!strongly)!team!optimal!in!every!game.!!
3.2.2'Level4k'predictions'To! make! predictions! of! level2k! individual! reasoning,! we! need! to! make!assumptions!about!L0!players.!The!usual!assumption!in!level2k!models!is!that!L0!choices!are! random,!but! in! the!model!of!Crawford!et!al.,! L0! responds! to!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!41!See!Gold!(2012)!for!a!review!of!Utility!group!function!properties.!
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payoff! salience! and! label! salience,! with! a! bias! for! payoff! salience.! In! our!games!there!are!no!labels,!so!it!is!impossible!to!follow!label!salience.!!Initially,!let!us!assume!that!L0!plays!at!random.!!Thus,!at!L0!in!every!game,!for!both!players,!pr!(R1)!=!pr(R2)!=!pr(R3)=!1/3.!!At! each!higher! level,! each!player! chooses! a! best! reply! to! a! co2player! at! the!immediately!lower!level.!For!example,!consider!game!1.!!At!L0,!players!randomise!over!R1,!R2!and!R3.!!At!L1,!player!1!best!replies!to!an!L0!co2player!by!choosing!R2,!and!similarly,!player!2’s!best!reply!is!R1.! !At!L2,!player!1’s!best!reply!to!an!L1!co2player!is!R2,!and!similarly,!player!2’s!best!reply!is!R1.!!At!L3,!player!1!chooses!R1!and!player!2!chooses!R2;!and!so!on!(see!Table!4.3).!!!!Table!4.3:!Level2K!theory’s!prediction!in!Game!1!when!L0!plays!at!random.!!!GAME!G1! L0! L1!(best!reply!to!L0)!
L2!(best!reply!to!L1)!
L3!(best!reply!to!L2)!! ! ! ! !Player!1!choice! R1,!R2,!or!R3! R2! R1! R2!Player!2!choice! R1,!R2,!or!R3! R1! R2! R1!!Generalising,! at! L1! each! player! makes! a! best! reply! to! L0.! This! is! as! if!randomising!over! strategies! that! are!optimal! for!her!under! the! assumption!that!the!other!player!randomises.!!At!L2!each!player!eliminates!strategies!not!chosen!by!her!co2player!at!L1,!then!optimises!as!at!L1.! !So,! if! for!any!player!there!is!a!unique!choice!at!any!level,!this!repeats!itself!for!her!co2player!at!the!next!level!up,!etc.!!This!principle!operates!at!L1!for!the!following!games:!
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2 in!G2!and!G6,!both!players!choose!R3!at!L1!and!this!repeats! itself!at!every!higher!level;!2 in!G1,!G3,!G9!and!G11,!one!of!the!players!has!R1!as!unique!choice,!the!other!has!R2,!and!this!repeats!itself!at!every!higher!level.!Also,! if! at! L1! both!players! randomise! over!R1! and!R2,! this! repeats! itself! at!every!higher!level.!!!This!happens!in!G5!and!G7.!In!G4!and!G8!we!observe!convergence!to!R3!from!L2.!G10!is!different:!at!L1,!one!player!has!R3!as!the!unique!choice!and!the!other!randomises! over! R1! and! R2.! This! pattern! repeats! itself! indefinitely.! ! So! at!every!level!above!L0,!averaging!over!the!two!players,!p(R3)=!½!and!p(R1)!=!p(R2)!=!¼!.!These!predictions!are!based!on!the!assumption!that!at!L0!players!choose!at!random.!If,!instead,!we!use!the!‘payoff!salience’!specification!of!level2k!theory,!L0!will! choose! the! slice!with! the!highest! own!payoff,! i.e.! L0!behaves! in! the!same!way!as!L1!does!in!the!random!specification;!L1!behaves!like!L2!and!so!on.!This!means!that!in!the!two!cases!the!predictions!are!very!similar,!but!in!the! ‘payoff! salience’! specification! they! are! sharper,! in! the! sense! that!convergence!takes!place!at!a!lower!level,!as!can!be!seen!in!table!4.4!for!game!1.!!Table!4.4:!Level2K!theory’s!prediction!in!Game!1!when!L0!follows!payoff!salience.!!GAME!G1! L0!! L1!(best!reply!to!L0)! L2!(best!reply!to!L1)!! ! ! !Player!1!choice! R2! R1! R2!Player!2!choice! R1! R2! R1!!
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It!is!worth!noticing!that!the!proportion!of!R3!choices!made!by!L1,!and!hence!by!all!higher! levels,! is!0! if! y!>!v,!w! (remember! that!y!≥!x).!This!happens! in!games!G1,!G3,!G5,!G7,!G9!and!G11.!A!sufficient!condition!for!this!result!is!that!R1,!R2!ex2post!Pareto2dominate!R3,!i.e.!x!≥!v,!w.!The!proportion!of!R3!choices!made!by!L1!is!1!if!v,!w!>!y.!This!happens!in!G2!and!G6.!In!addition,!the!proportion!of!R3!choices!made!by!L2,!and!then!by!all!higher! levels,! is! 1! if! v,!w! ≥! y.! This! happens! in! G4! and!G8.! So! if! R3! ex! post!Pareto2dominates!R1,!R2,!level2k!predicts!a!high!frequency!of!R3!choices.!Team! reasoning! and! Level2k! theory’s! predictions! for! ! games! 1211! are!reported!in!table!4.5.!!The!‘predicted!proportion!of!R3!choices’!averages!over!players! 1! and! 2.! ! In! every! case,! and! independently! of! the! distribution! of!levels,!each!theory!either!predicts!that!this!proportion!is!strictly!greater!than!1/3!or!predicts!that!this!proportion!is!strictly!less!than!1/3.!!Since!completely!random!choice!would!produce!a!1/3!proportion,!these!predictions!would!not!be!affected!by!adding!noise!to!the!model.!!Table!4.5.!Predicted!proportions!of!R3!choices.!!! Predicted!proportion!of!R3!choices!Game! Team!Reasoning! Level2k!L0! L1! L2! L3!G1! 1! 1/3! 0! 0! 0!G2! 1! 1/3! 1! 1! 1!G3! 1! 1/3! 0! 0! 0!G4! 1! 1/3! 3/4! 1! 1!G5! 1! 1/3! 0! 0! 0!G6! 1! 1/3! 1! 1! 1!G7! 1! 1/3! 0! 0! 0!
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G8! 1! 1/3! 2/3! 1! 1!G9! 1! 1/3! 0! 0! 0!G10! 1! 1/3! 1/2! 1/2! 1/2!G11! 1! 1/3! 0! 0! 0!!!
3.3 Hypotheses!Team! reasoning! and! level2k! theoretical! predictions! differ! in! games! G1,! G3,!G5,!G7,!G9!and! !G11,! in!which!team!reasoning!predicts!a!high!proportion!of!R3! choices! whereas! level2k! predicts! that! this! proportion! will! be! low.! ! It!follows! that! in! these! games! it! is! possible! to! discriminate! between! the! two!theories.!For!each!game!we!are!able!to!test!if!the!proportion!of!R3!choices!is!significantly! higher! or! lower! than! 1/3.! In! the! first! case,! the! hypothesis! of!level2k!reasoning!can!be!rejected,!whereas! in!the! latter!case,! the!hypothesis!of!team!reasoning!can!be!rejected.!Secondly,!we!are!interested!in!the!effect!of!Equality!and!Pareto!dominance!on!team!reasoning.!!The!experiment!is!designed!to!test!the!predictions!of!team!reasoning!under!a!range!of!different!values!of!v,'w,'x,'y.!In!particular!we!aim!to!test!whether!the!tendency! to! choose! the! team! optimal! slice! depends! on! ex! post! Pareto!dominance!and!equality.!With!regard!to!ex!post!Pareto!dominance!we!can!distinguish!three!cases:!!!
a. (v,w)!Pareto2dominates!(x,y)!and!(y,x),!i.e.,!R3!is!team2optimal!ex!post!as!well!as!ex!ante.! !This!occurs! in!G2,!G4,!G6!and!G8.! !This!condition!can!be!expected!to!favour!R3.!




e. v! ≠!w! and! x! =! y,! i.e.,! R3! is! unequal! and! R1! and! R2! are! equal.! ! This!occurs!in!G7,!G8!and!G10.!This!condition!can!be!expected!to!disfavour!R3.!
f. v!=!w!and!x!=!y,!i.e.,!R1,!R2!and!R3!are!all!equal.!!This!occurs!in!G5!and!G6.!!There!seems!no!reason!to!expect!this!condition!in!itself!either!to!favour!or!disfavour!R3.!
g. v!≠!w!and!x!≠!y,!i.e.,!R1,!R2!and!R3!are!all!unequal.!!This!occurs!in!G3,!G4!and!G9.! !There! seems!no! reason! to!expect! this! condition! in! itself!either!to!favour!or!disfavour!R3.!!Case! c! corresponds! to! the! first! clue! mentioned! in! section! 2,! case! d!corresponds!to!the!second!clue!and!case!b!to!the!third.!!!These!conclusions!are!summarised!in!table!4.6.!!!!





G1! ! G3! ! G5! ! G7! ! ! ! !
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c! No!PD! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! G9! G10! G11!e! R3!unequal,!R1,!R2!equal!
! ! ! ! ! ! G7! G8! ! G10! !
R3! a! R3!Par.!dominates!R1,!R2!
! G2! ! G4! ! G6! ! G8! ! ! !
d! R3!equal,!R1,!R2!unequal!
G1! G2! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! G11!
!There! are! some! games! for! which! only! one! of! the! conditions! a! to' e! (i.e.!conditions!that!favour!or!disfavour!R3)!holds.!!There!are!some!for!which!two!of! these! conditions! hold,! both! working! in! the! same! direction! (either!favouring!or!disfavouring!R3).! !And! there! are! some! for!which! two!of! these!conditions!hold,!working!in!opposite!directions.!In!particular:!2 In!G3! and!G5,! the!only! relevant! condition! that! holds! is!b.! ! In!G9! the!only! relevant! condition! that! holds! is! c.! ! In! these! games! we! would!expect!R3!to!be!disfavoured.!2 In!G4!and!G6,! the!only!relevant!condition! that!holds! is!a.! !We!would!expect!R3!to!be!favoured.!2 In!G2,!the!only!relevant!conditions!that!hold!are!a.!and!d.! !We!would!expect!R3!to!be!favoured.!2 In!G7,! the!only!relevant!conditions!that!hold!are!b.!and!e.! !We!would!expect!R3!to!be!disfavoured.!2 In!G10,!the!only!relevant!conditions!that!hold!are'c.!and!e.!!We!would!expect!R3!to!be!disfavoured.!2 In!each!of!G1,!G8!and!G11,!two!relevant!conditions!hold!(b!and!d!in!G1,!
e!and!a!in!G8,!and!c!and!d'in!G11),!working!in!opposite!directions.!!The!previous! considerations! represent! a!map,!by! the!help!of!which!we! can!look!deeply!into!the!evidence!we!obtain!from!the!experiment.!
! 91!
!







GAME! G1! G2! G3! G4! G5! G6! G7! G8! G9! G10! G11!Predicted!R3!proportion!
Level7K! <!1/3! >!1/3! <!1/3! >!1/3! <!1/3! >!1/3! <!1/3! >!1/3! <!1/3! >!1/3! <!1/3!
Team!
reasoning!
>!1/3! >!1/3! >!1/3! >!1/3! >!1/3! >!1/3! >!1/3! >!1/3! >!1/3! >!1/3! >!1/3!
Frequencies!R1!
P1! 4! 0! 51! 17! 48! 0! 50! 23! 7! 38! 1!

























P1! 14! 1! 41! 3! 30! 3! 31! 22! 12! 31! 9!

























P1! 52! 96! 5! 77! 19! 94! 16! 52! 78! 28! 60!



























!TOT! 140! 194! 194! 194! 194! 194! 194! 194! 194! 194! 140!
Coordination!rates!
! 56%! 99%! 41.2%! 71.1%! 42.2%! 92.8%! 32%! 42.2%! 57.7%! 32%! 74.3%!!
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!First! of! all,! remember! that! our! team! reasoning! predictions! depend! on! the!working! assumption! that! subjects! cannot! use! position! as! a! label! to!discriminate!between!R1,!R2!and!R3.! ! In!order!to!check!this!assumption!we!compare,!for!each!game,!the!distributions!of!choices!between!R1,!R2!and!R3!in!the!three!treatments!(which!differ!only!in!the!positions!of!the!slices).!!Our!test!uses!the!null!hypothesis!that,!for!each!game,!the!distribution!of!choices!is!the!same!across!treatments!(Pearson!Chi2squared!!in!Appendix!3).!!In! particular,! our! focus! is! on! the! proportions! of! R3! choices! across!!treatments.! Aggregating! R1! and! R2! choices! we! do! not! find! any! significant!!difference!between!treatments!(see!Appendix!3)43.!!!We! also! test! the! null! hypothesis! that! subjects! chose! at! random.! The! null!hypothesis!is!rejected!in!all!the!games!except!G1044.!Now,! with! these! premises,! we! can! present! the! principal! results! of! the!experiment.!With!regard!to!the!theoretical!predictions!we!can!conclude!that!both!theories!fail!in!some!games!(see!table!4.7).!!Team! reasoning! fails! in! predicting! R3! choice! in! G3,! G5! and! G7,! where! the!actual! proportion! of! R3! choices,! averaged! across! players! 1! and! 2,! is!significantly!smaller!then!1/3.45!In!all!these!game!R3!is!weakly!or!strictly!Pareto!dominated!ex!post:!all!these!games!satisfy!condition!b'(see!section!3.3)!.!!G7!also!satisfies!condition!e!(R3!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!43!When!we!consider! the!disaggregated! frequencies!of!R1,!R2,!and!R3!choices,!we! find! that!the! only! systematic! effect! is! that! in! treatment!A,! in! games!with! x! =! y,! ! R1! is! chosen!more!frequently!than!R2.!!In!some!cases,!test!results!are!not!reliable!because!the!expected!number!of!observations!in!some!cells!is!too!small,!as!in!G2!and!G6.!The!only!case!in!which!we!have!to!reject! the!null! hypothesis! that! the!proportion!of!R3! choices! is! the! same!across! treatments!also!by!aggregating!R1!and!R2!is!G9,!in!which!x!≠y!and!the!difference!between!treatments!is!the!result!of!the!behaviour!of!player!2!in!treatment!C.!44!Chi!squared!test!for!goodness!of!fit:!!Player! 1! Treatment! 1:! Chi! sq.=16.29,! p! =! .0003;! ! Player! 1! Treatment! 2:! Chi! sq.=! 2.26,! p! =!.3225;!!Player!1!Treatment!3:!Chi!sq.=!4.16,!p!=!.1249;!!Player!2!Treatment!1:!Chi!sq.=!7.82,!p!=!.02;!Player!2!Treatment!2:!Chi!sq.=!1.32,!p!=!.5179;!Player!2!Treatment!3:!Chi!sq.=!12.48,!p!=!.2894!45!In!a!two!tail!Binomial!test!with!n!=!140!and!probability!of!success!(choice=R3)!=!0.33,!59!or!more! successes! is! significantly!more! than! random! and! 35! or! fewer! is! significantly! less!than!random!(5%!level).!!With!n!=!194,!the!corresponding!numbers!are!79!and!53.!!!
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is! unequal,! whereas! R1,! R2! are! equal).! ! According! to! both! conditions,! R3!should!be!disfavoured.!!However,!condition!b!is!also!satisfied!in!G1!(R3!is!weakly!Pareto!dominated),!but!in!this!game!R3!is!chosen!by!74%!of!subjects.!!G1!differs!from!G3,!G5!and!G7!in!that!it!satisfies!both!b!(which!disfavours!R3)!and!d!(which!favours!it).!!It!seems!as!though!the!equality!of!R3!compensates!for!its!being!ex!post!Pareto!dominated.46!Level2k! fails! in! predicting! that! R3! will! not! be! chosen! in! G1,! G9,! and! G11,!where! the! proportion! of! R3! choices,! averaged! across! the! two! players,! is!significantly!greater!than!1/3.!In!G1!and!G11,!R3!is!equal!and!R1!and!R2!are!not!(i.e.!condition!d! is!satisfied).! ! In!G9,!all! three!outcomes!are!unequal,!but!R3!is!clearly!less!unequal!than!R1!and!R2.!In! the! rest! of! the! games! both! theories! agree! and! they!work!well.! The! only!exception!is!G10,!in!which!both!theories!fail:!the!proportion!of!R3!choices!is!not! significantly!different! from!1/3.! !This!game!satisfies!conditions!c! and!e,!both! of!which!disfavour!R3.! ! Level2k! theory! implies! that!R3! is! chosen!with!probability!1/2!at!each!level!above!L0.!!!!!
5. Discussion!The!results!of!the!experiment!agree!with!previous!literature:!in!coordination!games!neither!level2k!theory!nor!team!reasoning!can!explain!behaviour!in!all!the!games.!!But!differently!from!previous!experiments,!we!obtain!clearer!and!sharper! results:!we! are! able! to! identify! general! features! of! games! in!which!team! reasoning! theory! clearly! fails! in! predicting! choices,! and! of! games! in!which!it!succeeds.!!To!sum!up,!team!reasoning!fails!when!it!predicts!the!choice!of!a!slice!that!is!ex!post!Pareto!dominated!by! the!other! two!and! this! is!not!compensated!by!greater!equality!(games!G3,!G5!and!G7).!Team!reasoning!fails!also!(but!not!as!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!46!This!does!not!happen!the!other!way!round.!!In!G8,!R3!ex!post!Pareto!dominates!R1!and!R2!(i.e.,! condition!a,! favouring!R3)!but! is!unequal,!while!R1!and!R2!are!equal!(i.e.,! condition!e,!disfavouring!R3).!!Here!52%!of!subjects!choose!R3.!!
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badly)!in!G10,!where!the!team2optimal!choice!is!unequal!and!there!is!conflict!of!interests!(condition!c).!In! order! to! explain! the! experimental! evidence,! we! need! a! more! general!theory.!One!possible!line!of!explanation!is!based!on!Bacharach’s!theory.!According!to!him,! there! exist! two! modes! of! reasoning:! individual! reasoning! and! team!reasoning.!So!people!sometimes!team!reason,!sometimes!not.!For!Bacharach,!modes!of!reasoning!are!not!chosen!rationally.!The!process!by!which! a!mode! of! reasoning! comes! into! play! is! based! on! frames:! if! the!we2frame!comes!to!mind,!the!subject!will!group!identify!and!then!she!will!start!to!we2reason.! A! frame! can! be! defined! as! a! set! of! concepts! that! an! agent! uses!when!she!is!thinking!about!a!decision!problem.!It!cannot!be!chosen,!and!how!it!comes!to!mind!is!a!psychological!process:!! “Her!frame!stands!to!her!thoughts!as!a!set!of!axes!does!to!a!graph;!it! circumscribes! the! thoughts! that! are! logically! possible! for! her!(not!ever!but!at!the!time).!In!a!decision!problem,!everything!is!up!for! framing...! also! up! for! framing! are! her! coplayers,! and! herself”!(ib.!p.!69).!The! we2frame,! and! therefore! group! identification,! is! favoured! by! certain!characteristics!of!the!games.!This!means!that!team!reasoning!can!be!activated!when!particular!features!are!present.!According!to!Bacharach!(ib,!pp.!82–83),!one! such! feature! is! perceived! interdependence,! based! on! a! recognition! of!‘common!interest’.!!In!a!two2player!game,!the!players!have!a!common'interest!in! some! pair! of! strategies! s*! over! some! other! pair! s,! if! both! prefer! s*! to! s.!!Common! interest,! in! this! definition,! is! related! to! our! concept! of! Pareto!dominance.! !Another! feature,! called! ‘harmony!of!preferences’!by!Bacharach!ib,!pp.!63,!83),!is!related!to!the!degree!of!conflict!among!payoffs.!This!idea!has!been!developed!by!Zizzo!and!Tan!(2008).!They!propose!a!measure!of!game'
harmony,! based! on! correlation! between! payoffs,! which! is! related! to! our!concept!of!equality.!
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The! results! of! our! experiment! seems! to! suggest! that! ex! post! Pareto!dominance! and! equality! play! an! important! role! in! group! identification;! ex!ante! Pareto! dominance,! when! conflicting! with! ex2post! Pareto! dominance,!seems!not!to!be!sufficient.!Another! possible! explanation! of! our! data! is! based! on! the! assumption! that!team! reasoners! can! be!more! or! less! sophisticated.! !When! the! R3! slice! has!both!ex!post!Pareto2dominance!and!ex!post!equality,!players!can!see!that!R3!is! the!best! for! the! team!even!without!using!uniqueness.!When,! instead,! ex2post!Pareto2dominance!and!equality!are!not!present,!players!are!required!to!‘see’! uniqueness;! this! means! that! they! should! be! ‘sophisticated’! team!reasoners.!So! far! we! have! considered! the! distinction! between! level2k! reasoners! and!team! reasoners.! We! assumed! the! latter! to! be! sophisticated! enough! to!recognize! the!uniqueness!of!R3!and! to!be!aware!of! the!distinction!between!ex2ante! and! ex2post! Pareto! dominance.! ! However,! we! cannot! exclude! the!existence! of! a! different! type! of! team! reasoners,! who,! like! the! more!sophisticated! one,! is! willing! to! pursue! the! group! interest,! but! at! the! same!time!does!not!recognize!the!uniqueness!of!R3!and!adopts!the!simple!rule!of!thumb!of!focusing!on!Pareto!dominance!and!equality!of!the!outcome.!We!call!these!agents!‘naïve’!team!reasoners.!In!Bacharach’s!circumspect!team!reasoning,!there!is!space!for!individual!and!team! reasoners.! Team! reasoners! are! aware! of! the! presence! of! non! team!reasoners,!and!for!this!reason!they!maximize!the!utility!of!the!team!given!the!proportion!of! individual! reasoners.! In!a! similar!way,! to!allow!a!presence!of!naïve! team! reasoners! does! not!means! that! everybody! is! naïve:! R1! and! R2!choices!could!be!the!results!of! the!presence!of!naïve!team!reasoners!and!of!more! sophisticated! ones,! who! take! in! account! the! proportion! of! naïve!reasoners.!Assuming!that!the!team!utility!function!is!increasing!and!concave,!naïve!team!reasoning!organizes!the!data!pretty!well:!it!implies!that!R3!is!the!best!option!in!G2,!G4,!G6,!G9,!G11!and!R1!and!R2!are!the!best!options!in!G3,!G5,!G7,!G10;!the!implication!is!not!clear!in!G1!where!R3!is!equal!but!Pareto!dominated!by!R1!and!R2.!!
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It! is! worth! noticing! that! the! existence! of! naïve! team! reasoners! can! also!explain! some!experimental! results! reported! in!previous! literature.!Take! for!example!game!‘AM!4’!(figure!4.2)!reported!by!Crawford!et!al.!(2008),!which!is!very!similar!to!game!G3.! !!!!!!!!Figure!4.2.!!Crawford’s!et!al.!(2008)!AM4!!Game.!!The! sophisticated! team!reasoning! solution! for! this! game! is!B! (for! the! same!considerations!we!made!in!section!3.2.1).!!According!to!Crawford!et!al.,!level2
k! theory! predicts! L! and! B.! In! this! game! subjects! chose! L! and! R,! which! is!exactly!what!a!naïve!team!reasoner!does,!and!this!is!also!the!way!the!authors!explain! the! results.! They! say! that! ‘B! for! both’! is! less! equitable! and!weakly!Pareto2dominated!by!‘R!for!both’.!!If!we!exclude!B,!!the!players!are!left!with!a!2x2! battle! of! sexes! game! in! which! they! will! alternate! between! R! and! L,!because!there!is!no!way!to!break!the!symmetry.!!Also,!the!choices!of!Nottingham!subjects!in!the!‘number!task’!games!studied!by!Bardsley!et!al.!(2010)!can!be!explained!by!allowing!the!presence!of!naïve!team! reasoning.! In! these! games! there! is! a! conflict! between! ex! ante! and! ex!post! Pareto! dominance.! As! we! have! already! mentioned! in! section! 2.2,!according!to!the!authors,! in!the!Amsterdam!version!of!the!experiment!most!of! the! players! coordinated! on! (9,9)! because! they! were! primed! to! see! the!uniqueness!of!choices.!In!Nottingham!version,!without!any!priming,!it!seems!as!though!players!behave!like!naïve!team!reasoners.!
!
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However,!merely!assuming!the!presence!of!naïve!team!reasoners!would!not!explain!coordination!in!pure!coordination!games!and!in!games!with!conflict!of! interests! (like! battle! of! the! sexes! games).! To! solve! a! pure! coordination!games,!team2reasoning!players!are!required!to!re2describe!the!game!in!a!way!which! requires! some! degree! of! sophistication.! And! experimental! evidence!shows!that!players!are!good!at!coordinating!in!pure!coordination!games.!!At! the! same! time,! experimental! evidence! shows! that! it! is!more! difficult! to!coordinate!in!battle!of!the!sexes!games!than!in!pure!coordination!games.!!So!if!coordination!is!explained!by!team!reasoning,!we!have!to!assume!that!team!reasoning!tends!to!be!switched!off!by!battle!of!the!sexes!games.!Overall,!the!evidence!suggests!that!behaviour!in!coordination!games!might!be!explained! by! introducing! a! model! containing! both! individual! and! team!reasoners,! with! team! reasoners! having! different! levels! of! sophistication,!activated!by!the!characteristics!of!the!games.!!!
'
6. Conclusion!Our! experiment! was! designed! with! two! main! objectives:! to! discriminate!between!level2k!and!team!reasoning!theories,!and!to!investigate!three!clues,!already!present!in!previous!literature,!about!the!effects!of!Pareto!ranking!of!payoffs,! equality,! and! differences! among! ex! ante! and! ex! post! Pareto!dominance.!!It!represents!a!step!forward!to!the!understanding!of!coordinating!behaviour.!On! the!one!hand,! it! confirms!previous! findings! that!neither! team!reasoning!nor! cognitive! hierarchy! models! can! completely! explain! experimental!evidence.! On! the! other! hand! it! reveals! how! some! characteristics! of! the!equilibria! in! games,! such! as! ex! ante! or! ex! post! Pareto! dominance! and!equality,!can!attract!players.!!As!we! have! already!mentioned! in! previous! section,! in! order! to! explain! the!evidence,!a!more!general!theory!is!needed.!Crawford!et!al.!(2008)!suggested!that! a! ‘judicious’! combination! of! team! reasoning! and! level2k! theories,!incorporating!other!considerations,!is!needed.!!
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Subjects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 1A(1) 2B(1) 3C(1) 4A(1) 5B(1) 6C(1) 7B(1) 8C(1) 9A(1) 10B(1) 11A(1)
2 11B(1) 1A(1) 2C(1) 3A(1) 4B(1) 10C(1) 6B(1) 7C(1) 8A(1) 9B(1) 5C(1)
3 4C(1) 5B(1) 11C(1) 2C(1) 3B(1) 9C(1) 10B(1) 6C(1) 7A(1) 8B(1) 1C(1)
4 3C(1) 4B(1) 5C(1) 1A(1) 2B(1) 8C(1) 9B(1) 10C(1) 6A(1) 7B(1) 11C(1)
5 2A(1) 3B(1) 4C(1) 5A(1) 11B(1) 7C(1) 8B(1) 9C(1) 10A(1) 6B(1) 1B(1)
6 1A(2) 3B(2) 5C(2) 2C(2) 4B(2) 6C(2) 8B(2) 10C(2) 7A(2) 9B(2) 11A
7 11B(2) 2B(2) 4C(2) 1A(2) 3B(2) 10C(2) 7B(2) 9C(2) 6A(2) 8B(2) 5C(2)
8 4C(2) 1A(2) 3C(2) 5A(2) 2B(2) 9C(2) 6B(2) 8C(2) 10A(2) 7B(2) 1C(2)
9 3C(2) 5B(2) 2C(2) 4A(2) 11B(2) 8C(2) 10B(2) 7C(2) 9A(2) 6B(2) 11C(2)
10 2A(2) 4B(2) 11C(2) 3A(2) 5B(2) 7C(2) 9B(2) 6C(2) 8A(2) 10B(2) 1B(2)
11 11A(1) 7B(1) 8C(1) 9A(1) 10B(1) 1A(1) 2B(1) 3C(1) 4A(1) 5B(1) 6A(1)
12 10A(1) 11B(1) 7C(1) 8A(1) 9B(1) 5A(1) 1B(1) 2C(1) 3A(1) 4B(1) 6B(1)
13 9A(1) 10B(1) 6C(1) 11C(1) 8B(1) 4A(1) 5B(1) 1C(1) 2A(1) 3B(1) 7A(1)
14 8A(1) 9B(1) 10C(1) 6A(1) 7B(1) 3A(1) 4B(1) 5C(1) 1B(1) 2B(1) 11A(1)
15 7A(1) 8B(1) 9C(1) 10A(1) 6B(1) 11B(1) 3B(1) 4C(1) 5A(1) 1C(1) 2A(1)
16 11A(2) 8B(2) 10C(2) 11C(2) 9B(2) 1A(2) 3B(2) 5C(2) 2A(2) 4B(2) 6A(2)
17 10A(2) 7B(2) 9C(2) 6A(2) 8B(2) 5A(2) 2B(2) 4C(2) 1B(2) 3B(2) 6B(2)
18 9A(2) 11B(2) 8C(2) 10A(2) 7B(2) 4A(2) 1B(2) 3C(2) 5A(2) 2B(2) 7A(2)
19 8A(2) 10B(2) 7C(2) 9A(2) 6B(2) 3A(2) 5B(2) 2C(2) 4A(2) 1C(2) 11A(2)





Subjects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 1B(1) 2B(1) 3C(1) 4C(1) 5C(1) 6C(1) 7C(1) 8C(1) 9C(1) 10C(1) 11C(1)
2 11B(1) 1C(1) 2C(1) 3C(1) 4B(1) 10A(1) 6B(1) 7C(1) 8C(1) 9B(1) 5A(1)
3 4A(1) 11C(1) 3B(1) 1B(1) 2A(1) 9A(1) 10B(1) 8B(1) 6B(1) 7A(1) 5B(1)
4 3A(1) 4B(1) 5A(1) 2C(1) 1A(1) 8A(1) 9B(1) 10A(1) 7B(1) 6A(1) 11A(1)
5 1B(2) 4B(2) 3B(2) 3C(2) 2A(2) 6C(2) 9B(2) 10A(2) 8C(2) 7A(2) 11C(2)
6 11B(2) 2B(2) 5A(2) 1B(2) 4B(2) 10A(2) 7C(2) 8B(2) 6B(2) 9B(2) 5A(2)
7 4A(2) 1C(2) 3C(2) 2C(2) 5C(2) 9A(2) 6B(2) 8C(2) 7B(2) 10C(2) 5B(2)
8 3A(2) 11C(2) 2C(2) 4C(2) 1A(2) 8A(2) 10B(2) 7C(2) 9C(2) 6A(2) 11A(2)
9 11A(1) 7B(1) 8C(1) 9A(1) 10B(1) 1A(1) 2B(1) 3C(1) 4A(1) 5B(1) 6A(1)
10 10A(1) 11B(1) 7C(1) 8A(1) 9B(1) 5A(1) 1B(1) 2C(1) 3A(1) 4B(1) 6B(1)
11 9A(1) 10B(1) 6C(1) 11C(1) 8B(1) 4A(1) 5B(1) 1C(1) 2A(1) 3B(1) 7A(1)
12 8A(1) 9B(1) 10C(1) 6A(1) 7B(1) 3A(1) 4B(1) 5C(1) 1A(1) 2B(1) 11A(1)
13 7A(1) 8B(1) 9C(1) 10A(1) 6B(1) 11B(1) 3B(1) 4C(1) 5A(1) 1C(1) 2A(1)
14 11A(2) 8B(2) 10C(2) 11C(2) 9B(2) 1A(2) 3B(2) 5C(2) 2A(2) 4B(2) 6A(2)
15 10A(2) 7B(2) 9C(2) 6A(2) 8B(2) 5A(2) 2B(2) 4C(2) 1A(2) 3B(2) 6B(2)
16 9A(2) 11B(2) 8C(2) 10A(2) 7B(2) 4A(2) 1B(2) 3C(2) 5A(2) 2B(2) 7A(2)
17 8A(2) 10B(2) 7C(2) 9A(2) 6B(2) 3A(2) 5B(2) 2C(2) 4A(2) 1C(2) 11A(2)








Subjects 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 11A(1) 2B(1) 3C(1) 4C(1) 5C(1) 6C(1) 7B(1) 8C(1) 9C(1) 10C(1) 1C(1)
2 5A(1) 1B(1) 2C(1) 3C(1) 4B(1) 10A(1) 6B(1) 7C(1) 8C(1) 9B(1) 11B(1)
3 4A(1) 11C(1) 1A(1) 5B(1) 2A(1) 9A(1) 8B(1) 6A(1) 10B(1) 7B(1) 3B(1)
4 11A(2) 11C(2) 2C(2) 4C(2) 5C(2) 6C(2) 8B(2) 7C(2) 9C(2) 10C(2) 1C(2)
5 5A(2) 2B(2) 1A(2) 3C(2) 4B(2) 10A(2) 7B(2) 6A(2) 8C(2) 9B(2) 11B(2)
6 4A(2) 1B(2) 3C(2) 5B(2) 2A(2) 9A(2) 6B(2) 8C(2) 10B(2) 7B(2) 3B(2)
7 11A(1) 7B(1) 8C(1) 9A(1) 10B(1) 1A(1) 2B(1) 3C(1) 4A(1) 5B(1) 6A(1)
8 10A(1) 11B(1) 7C(1) 8A(1) 9B(1) 5A(1) 1B(1) 2C(1) 3A(1) 4B(1) 6B(1)
9 9A(1) 10B(1) 6C(1) 11C(1) 8B(1) 4A(1) 5B(1) 1C(1) 2A(1) 3B(1) 7A(1)
10 8A(1) 9B(1) 10C(1) 6A(1) 7B(1) 3A(1) 4B(1) 5C(1) 1A(1) 2B(1) 11A(1)
11 7A(1) 8B(1) 9C(1) 10A(1) 6B(1) 11B(1) 3B(1) 4C(1) 5A(1) 1B(1) 2A(1)
12 11A(2) 8B(2) 10C(2) 11C(2) 9B(2) 1A(2) 3B(2) 5C(2) 2A(2) 4B(2) 6A(2)
13 10A(2) 7B(2) 9C(2) 6A(2) 8B(2) 5A(2) 2B(2) 4C(2) 1A(2) 3B(2) 6B(2)
14 9A(2) 11B(2) 8C(2) 10A(2) 7B(2) 4A(2) 1B(2) 3C(2) 5A(2) 2B(2) 7A(2)
15 8A(2) 10B(2) 7C(2) 9A(2) 6B(2) 3A(2) 5B(2) 2C(2) 4A(2) 1B(2) 11A(2)








Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C
R1/R2 3 7 8 R1/R2 1 0 0
P1 P1 ) ) ) )
R3 25 14 13 R3 31 39 26
TOT 28 21 21 TOT 32 39 26
Binomial)two)sided)test)(n=R1+R2+R3)choices;)k=R3)choices;)p=0.33) p=0.000 p=0.001 p=0.008 Binomial)two)sided)test)(n=R1+R2+R3)choices;)k=R3)choices;)p=0.33)p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000
H0):)same)distr.)across)treatments);)Pearson)chi2(2))=)))5.62)))p>0.05 Pearson)chi2(2))=)))2.0524)))p>0.05
R1/R2 5 5 8 R1/R2 0 0 0
P2 P2 ) ) ) )
R3 23 16 13 R3 32 39 26
TOT 28 21 21 TOT 32 39 26
Binomial)two)sided)test)(n=R1+R2+R3)choices;)k=R3)choices;)p=0.33) p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.008 Binomial)two)sided)test)(n=R1+R2+R3)choices;)k=R3)choices;)p=0.33)p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000
H0):)same)distr.)across)treatments);)Pearson)chi2(2))=)))2.63)))p>0.05 Pearson)chi2(2))=)))I))
Coord.%Rate%(%) 75 52.3 38 Coord.%Rate%(%) 96.9 100 100
GAME%G3 GAME%G4
Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C
R1/R2 29 37 26 R1/R2 6 10 4
P1 ) ) ) ) P1 R2 ) ) )
R3 2 2 1 R3 27 29 21
TOT 31 39 27 TOT 33 39 25
Binomial)two)sided)test)(n=R1+R2+R3)choices;)k=R3)choices;)p=0.33) p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 Binomial)two)sided)test)(n=R1+R2+R3)choices;)k=R3)choices;)p=0.33)p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000
Pearson)chi2(2))=))0.22))p>0.05 Pearson)chi2(2))=))1.04))p>0.05
R1/R2 30 38 27 R1/R2 8 5 6
P2 ) ) ) ) P2 ) ) ) )
R3 1 1 0 R3 25 34 19
TOT 31 39 27 TOT 33 39 25
Binomial)two)sided)test)(n=R1+R2+R3)choices;)k=R3)choices;)p=0.33) p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000 Binomial)two)sided)test)(n=R1+R2+R3)choices;)k=R3)choices;)p=0.33)p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000
Pearson)chi2(2))=)))0.82))p>0.05 Pearson)chi2(2))=)))1.89))p>0.05




Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C
R1 28 30 20 R1/R2( 0 0 3
R2 ( ( (( ( ( ( ( (
P1 R3 6 8 5 P1 R3 33 39 22
TOT 34 38 25 TOT 33 39 25
Binomial(two(sided(test((n=R1+R2+R3(choices;(k=R3(choices;(p=0.33) p=0.23 p=0.12 p=0.20 Binomial(two(sided(test((n=R1+R2+R3(choices;(k=R3(choices;(p=0.33)p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000
H0(:(same(distr.(across(treatments;(Pearson(chi2(2)(=((0.13(((p>0.05 Pearson(chi2(2)(=(((8.9157(((p<0.05
R1/R2 31 31 20 R1/R2 1 1 2
( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
P2 R3 3 7 5 P2 R3 32 38 23
TOT 34 38 25 TOT 33 39 25
Binomial(two(sided(test((n=R1+R2+R3(choices;(k=R3(choices;(p=0.33) p=0.001 p=0.06 p=0.20 Binomial(two(sided(test((n=R1+R2+R3(choices;(k=R3(choices;(p=0.33)p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000
H0(:(same(distr.(across(treatments;(Pearson(chi2(2)(=((1.79((p>0.05 Pearson(chi2(2)(=(1.28((p>0.05
Coord.%Rate%(%) 44 42 40 Coord.%Rate%(%) 97 97.4 80
GAME%G7 GAME%G8
Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C
R1/R2 24 35 22 R1/R2 17 16 12
( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
P1 R3 7 5 4 P1 R3 14 23 15
TOT 31 40 26 TOT 31 39 27
Binomial(two(sided(test((n=R1+R2+R3(choices;(k=R3(choices;(p=0.33) p=0.25 p=0.004 p=0.06 Binomial(two(sided(test((n=R1+R2+R3(choices;(k=R3(choices;(p=0.33)p=0.18 p=0.001 p=0.02
(Pearson(chi2(2)(=((1.32(p>0.05 Pearson(chi2(2)(=(((1.38((p>0.05
R1/R2 25 33 21 R1/R2 16 21 12
( ( ( ( ( ( ( (
P2 R3 6 7 5 P2 R3 15 18 15
TOT 31 40 26 TOT 31 39 27
Binomial(two(sided(test((n=R1+R2+R3(choices;(k=R3(choices;(p=0.33) p=0.12 p=0.04 p=0.15 Binomial(two(sided(test((n=R1+R2+R3(choices;(k=R3(choices;(p=0.33)p=0.08 p=0.09 p=0.02
Pearson(chi2(2)(=(((0.05((p>0.05 Pearson(chi2(2)(=(((0.58(p>0.05




Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C
R1/R2 8 5 6 R1/R2 21 28 20
P1 * * * * P1 * * * *
R3 25 34 19 R3 13 10 5
TOT 33 39 25 TOT 34 38 25
Binomial*two*sided*test*(n=R1+R2+R3*choices;*k=R3*choices;*p=0.33) p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 Binomial*two*sided*test*(n=R1+R2+R3*choices;*k=R3*choices;*p=0.33)p=0.58 p=0.49 p=0.20
H0*:*same*distr.*across*treatments;*Pearson*chi2(2)*=***1.89*p>0.05 Pearson*chi2(2)*=*1.18**p>0.05
R1/R2 10 10 14 R1/R2 21 27 18
P2 * * * * P2 * * * *
R3 23 29 11 R3 13 11 7
TOT 33 39 25 TOT 34 38 25
Binomial*two*sided*test*(n=R1+R2+R3*choices;*k=R3*choices;*p=0.33) p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.28 Binomial*two*sided*test*(n=R1+R2+R3*choices;*k=R3*choices;*p=0.33)p=0.58 p=0.73 p=0.67
H0*:*same*distr.*across*treatments;*Pearson*chi2(4)*=***6.66***p<0.05 Pearson*chi2(2)*=***0.95***p>0.05
Coord.%Rate%(%) 60.6 69 36 Coord.%Rate%(%) 26.4 34.2 36
GAME%G11
Treat.A Treat.B Treat.C
R1/R2 2 6 2
P1 * * * *
R3 19 22 19
TOT 21 28 21
Binomial*two*sided*test*(n=R1+R2+R3*choices;*k=R3*choices;*p=0.33) p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000
Pearson*chi2(2)*=**1.94**p>0.05
R1/R2 3 2 4
P2 * * * *
R3 18 26 17
TOT 21 28 21
Binomial*two*sided*test*(n=R1+R2+R3*choices;*k=R3*choices;*p=0.33) p=0.000 p=0.000 p=0.000
Pearson*chi2(2)*=***1.57***p>0.05






!!!Welcome! to! this! experiment! on! decisional! processes! and! thank! you! for!participating!in!it.!The!experiment!will!last!approximately!40!minutes.!You! will! receive! 3! euro! for! your! participation.! You! can! gain! more! money,!depending!on!your!choices!and!on!choices!of!other!participants.!Your! answers! and! your! choices! will! be! completely! anonymous.! The!experimenters! are! not! able! to! associate! your! choices! and! your! answers! to!your!name.!We! ask! you! to! pay! attention! to! the! instructions! that! will! appear! on! your!screen.!They!will!be!read!aloud!by!one!of!the!experimenters.!If!you!have!any!doubts!or!questions!about!anything!related!to!the!experiment!raise!your!hand:!one!of!the!experimenters!will!come.!!!
! 106!
!!During! the! experiment! you! will! be! asked! to! make! choices.! The! main!characteristics!of!the!choices!can!be!described!through!an!example.!First!of! all! you!will! be!matched!with!another!person! in! this! room.!You!will!never! know! the! identity! or! the! other! person,! nor! will! he/she! know! your!identity.!On! the!screen!of!your!computer!will!appear!a! figure!similar! to! the!one!you!are!now!seeing!above.!The!numbers!on!the!figure,!which!are!only!examples,!represent!the!payments!in!euro!for!each!combination!of!choices.!Click!on!‘continue’!to!proceed.!!!
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!!The!experiment.!The! experiment! consists! of! eleven! rounds.! In! each! round! you! must! make!decisions!on!figures!similar!to!the!ones!you!have!seen!before.!At!the!beginning!of!each!round!you!will!be!matched!with!a!different!person,!and!you!will!see!a!figure!with!different!payments.!As! in! the! previous! example,! if! you! and! the! other! person! choose! the! same!circle,! you!will! get! the! corresponding! amount.! If! you! and! the! other! person!choose!a!different!circle!the!payment!will!be!0!euro.!At!the!end!of!each!round!you!will!not!receive!any!feedback!on!the!results.!At! the!end!of! the!experiment,! one!of! the! rounds!will! be! randomly! selected,!and!you!will!receive!the!corresponding!payment!associated!to!that!round.!In!particular!before!starting!the!experiment!one!participant!will!draw!a!ticket!from!a!box!containing!10!tickets!numbered!from!1!to!11.!The!ticket!(without!being!opened)!will!be!given!to!the!experimenter.!At!the!end!of!the!experiment!you!will!know!the!selected!round.!Click!on!‘continue’!to!proceed.!!
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!!!
!!At!the!beginning!of!each!round!the!figure!with!three!circles!will!be!shown.!Before!making!your!choice!you!must!wait!for!20!seconds.!In!order!to!select!a!choice!it!is!sufficient!to!click!on!the!selected!circle.!If!you!want! to! change!your! choice,! you!must! click! again!on! the! selected! choice! in!order!to!deselect!it,!then!you!can!click!on!the!other!choice.!When!your!decision!is!definitive!you!must!click!on!the!‘ok’!button,!in!order!to!go!to!the!following!round.!Click!on!‘continue’!to!proceed.!!!!
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